

Assessment of the Demobilization and Disarmament Process in Liberia

June 1997


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**ASSESSMENT OF THE DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT
PROCESS IN LIBERIA**

FINAL REPORT

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JUNE 1997

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I. Executive Summary

The purpose of this report was to achieve a more solid understanding of the effectiveness of Liberia's disarmament and demobilization process¹ (D&D) in order to design appropriate interventions to enhance the peace process.

Scope of work objectives included:

- I. To determine the outcome of D&D operations that were carried out in Liberia between November 1996 and February 1997;
- II. To assess the impact of D&D on the present security conditions in the country;
- III. To identify areas for intervention activities to improve the security conditions and support national reintegration efforts.

This document is the result of gathering and analyzing data on the D&D process available from UN-HACO, NGO and agency reports, and field visits and interviews with key informants. Key informants included officials from ECOMOG, UNOMIL, UN-HACO, UNOPS, national and international NGOs, civilian authorities, community leaders, community members and demobilized soldiers. Field sites visited were spread through Monterrado, Bomi, Lofa, Nimba, Bong, Margibi and Grand Bassa counties².

The main team conclusions include:

- Established agreements viz. operational procedures for disarmament and demobilization (D&D) reached in the Abuja Accords (I and II) were not fulfilled in their entirety during the November 22, 1996 - February 7, 1997 D&D process. Consequently, non-implementation of these critical demobilization components within the accords might have a deleterious effect on the success and stability of the peace process, given the possibilities for remobilization of certain factions.
- While perhaps politically attractive, the Abuja disarmament and demobilization implementation schedule was ambitious and unrealistic as far as operational realities went At the commencement of D&D:
 - as a result of the April 6, 1996 debacle, the international community was severely handicapped in its resource base and ability to respond to an effort as major as the disarmament and demobilization of what was thought to be upwards of 60,000 combatants;
 - ECOMOG and UNOMIL were not fully deployed, and many parts of the country were inaccessible due to the insecurity which prevailed;

¹ While usually lumped together, disarmament and demobilization are two distinct processes.

² For the specific sites and persons contacted, see appendices.

- the Liberian National Transition Government (LTNG), the third interim government established by ECOWAS, continued to be dysfunctional due to factionalization and domination by the interests of the major warlords; and,
 - there was not an operational national reintegration program with no forward linkages to the what few reintegration programs existed (either specifically targeting ex-fighters or not).
-
- There were countrywide inconsistencies in both the disarmament and demobilization components. Criteria for disarmament varied according to local circumstance or changing policy (including numbers of rounds of ammunition and quality of weapons required for a demobilization card, pre-disarmament bulk collection of weapons or individual delivery).
 - Regarding demobilization, lack of a post-disarmament plan and support resulted in inconsistent messages given to ex-fighters, and an imperfect understanding of what benefits were to accrue to the ex-fighters by all the actors (ECOMOG, UN agencies, NGOs and the fighters themselves).
 - The lack of any coherent or comprehensive demobilization scheme is particularly worrisome in the light of a moribund national reintegration and resettlement plan. A pre-April 6th reintegration program exists, authored by the UNDP in collaboration with the LTNG (I), USAID, and EU, but has had trouble regaining momentum after the April fighting. This plan adopted a non-targeting approach concerning reintegration of demobilized soldiers.
 - Although there are a number of on-going programs for bridging Liberia's communities from war to peace, these initiatives suffer from the lack of over-all strategic planning and an integrated approach. Reasons for this include: the factionalization, incapacity and lack of transparency of the LTNG and consequent lack of confidence in it by the international community; a lukewarm response to the UN's Consolidated Appeal for the funding of demobilization, resettlement and reintegration programs; the INGO's Joint Policy of Operations (in light of April 1996) which adopted a cautious approach to capital asset investment and distribution of assistance; and rivalries within the UN agencies.
 - These issues notwithstanding, the disarmament process is perceived by ECOMOG, UNOMIL and the Liberian civilians interviewed as a success (although not so by the majority of INGOs in Monrovia). Liberia's current security environment supports the perception of successful disarmament, at least regarding the individual soldier and in the short-term.
 - Since the end of the disarmament process, no major incidents of organized conflict have been reported, guns are not visible either in the city or the rural areas, predatory gangs that controlled towns, villages and rural areas with armed threat have disappeared. While the jury is still out on the robustness and longer-term effectiveness of overall disarmament on the factions' ability to wage war, it is clear that disarmament has been a successful process in the short-term and symbolic sense.
 - Therefore, the ultimate purpose of disarmament (as stipulated in the various peace accords), i.e., the creation of a security environment conducive to the holding of free and fair elections, has, symbolically and with some qualifications, been met so far.

- While the disarmament of Liberian combatants was a qualified success, their demobilization was not. The race toward schedule compliance meant sound demobilization strategy, design and programming were short-changed in order to meet the logistical needs of accessing / provisioning D&D sites and going through the motions.
- Demobilization's ultimate goal is to demilitarize a faction through severing the military command and control structure and disbanding the "organic" composition of an armed force. According to the Cotonou Accords, and in accordance with other (not always successful) demobilization experiences, the Liberian demobilization plan included encampment "to serve as a transit point for further education, training, and rehabilitation of said combatants". Encampment was not a component of the Liberian demobilization process, nor was transport of the new ex-fighters to a desired destination. This meant that after disarmament virtually all the adult ex-fighters merely returned whence they had been summoned, under the same command and control environment they left.
- Cautious optimism for the upcoming elections and their results reigns among the Liberian population. The newfound security in the country facilitates this optimism. Whether this security is the result of disarmament or a honeymoon period in which the faction leaders are biding their time in anticipation of the polls remains to be seen.
- From a programming perspective, there is little USAID can do if all-out conflict resurfaces. If elections are held and the results respected, a number of scenarios can be speculated upon but are of little help in programming due to the wide range of presidential aspirants and their proven unpredictability. USAID should therefore program for known opportunities in the short-term (pre- and immediately post-elections) and implement a program that is regionally targeted and flexible with built-in, quick response mechanisms. Specifically,
 - i□ In order to get a fuller understanding of the factions' compositions and structures, the team recommends technical, logistical and clerical assistance to UNOMIL to process the thousands of disarmament registration forms currently on hardcopy. UN-HACO has a database of information that gives a partial picture of those individuals registered at D&D. It would be very helpful to cross-check this information with a UNOMIL database, to inform programming for ex-combatants (if necessary) in the future. Also, the NDDC claims they have pre-registration surveys of combatants on hand; this opportunity might also be explored further.
 - ii□ The team recommends a "Provincial Fund" (in Liberia's case, a County Fund) approach for USAID assistance.

This report is structured for ease of readership.

- *Section II: General background* summarizes Liberia's recent history in relation to the armed conflict, the different peace accords and the various events leading into disarmament and demobilization activities.

- *Section III: The Operational Aspects of Demobilization* describes the D&D operations as established by the peace agreements, their evolution through the planning and coordination exercises and the way they actually occurred.
- *Section IV: Outcomes of the Demobilization* offers the team findings from the quantitative perspective as well as the qualitative viewpoints gathered by the team during interviews with key informants.
- *Section V: Recommendations for Programming* summarizes our suggestions in relation to possible programs to support Liberia's transition from war to peace and stabilize the ex-combatant population through reintegration activities.
- *Section VI: Team Conclusions* provides with a short summary of our conclusions during the assessment.
- *Section VII: Appendices* include our scope of work, our approach and methodology, sources of data, a glossary of terms, list of key informants, additional information about target areas strategies and the raw statistical representation of the demobilization database analysis.

II. General Background

A. History of the conflict

In 1822, with the assistance of American private philanthropic organizations, groups of freed slaves from the United States began to settle in coastal West Africa; twenty-five years later, in 1847, they declared their colony to be a free republic and named it Liberia. The first independent country on the African continent, Liberia modeled its constitution after that of the United States. For 133 years, Liberia remained independent and stable. But the political and economic domination by the so-called Americo-Liberians of the indigenous ethnic groups created ever-rising tensions; the former, who constituted about 5% of the population, held jobs in the urban, modern economy, while about 80% of the latter engaged in subsistence agriculture and had a lower standard of living.

Americo-Liberian rule came to an abrupt end in 1980, when 28-year old Master Sergeant Samuel K. Doe staged a violent coup and toppled the old regime. Ethnic hostilities increased under President Doe; although indigenous Liberians ruled the country, the Krahn people (the small ethnic group to which Doe belonged) were the greatest beneficiaries of the takeover. The Doe government, which was notorious for human rights abuses, mistreated non-Krahn indigenous ethnic groups as well as Americo-Liberians.

On December 24, 1989, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), led by Charles Taylor, crossed into Liberia from Cote d'Ivoire, sparking the current civil war. Taylor, age 48, received a degree in economics in the United States, and was active in the U.S. Liberian community until his return to Liberia shortly after the 1980 military coup. Under investigation for stealing nearly \$1 million while serving as deputy minister in the Doe government, Taylor fled to the United States. He was arrested in May 1984 in Somerville, Mass. In September 1985, Taylor broke out of prison with four convicted felons while his deportation hearing proceedings were pending.

As hostilities initiated by the NPFL dragged on, other factions were spawned; Doe was murdered by a small NPFL splinter group in September 1990. The other major rebel groups to emerge were: the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO-K), led by Alhaji Kromah; Roosevelt Johnson's United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO-J); George Boley's Liberia Peace Council (LPC); and the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) composed of remnants of the late President Samuel Doe's army and led by General Hezekiah Bowen.

In August 1990, the 16-member Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) agreed - although not unanimously - to send a joint military force, the Economic Community Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), and place it under Nigerian leadership. ECOMOG had four main objectives: impose a cease-fire, help Liberians establish an interim government until elections could be held, stop the killing of innocent civilians, and ensure the safe evacuation of foreign nationals. It was also in the interests of member states to quell hostilities so that the conflict would not spread into neighboring countries. Once in Liberia the ECOMOG force,

dominated by Nigerians, quickly adopted a strategy of attempting to defeat Taylor's NPFL, seen by some observers as the most dangerous and recalcitrant of the guerrilla groups. ECOMOG, though plagued by a host of problems itself, was able to stabilize Monrovia from 1990 through 1995, while Taylor's forces, headquartered in the north-central town of Gbarnga, controlled much of the rest of the countryside.

B. Peace Agreements and the Transitional Government

Beginning in November 1990, the factions signed numerous cease-fires and agreements, but none was effective until 1995. Under the July 1993 Cotonou Agreement, the factions agreed that ECOMOG would disarm the fighters, that UN monitors would supervise their demobilization, and that a transitional council would be formed. However, the factions refused to disarm, and the election scheduled for September 7, 1994, was canceled because of continued fighting. A new agreement was reached at Akosombo, Ghana on September 12, and agreements supporting that accord were signed on December 21, 1994.

On September 22, 1993, the UN Security Council established the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), and deployed 368 military observers in early 1994 to supervise the demobilization of combatants after they had turned in their weapons and to monitor the cease-fire.

On August 20, 1995, a peace accord that had been signed by the seven factions fighting in Liberia's civil war and representatives of the civilian community came into effect. The so-called Abuja Accord, named after the Nigerian capital where it was signed, followed several months of concerted effort by ECOWAS, led by Ghana and Nigeria. The main point of contention had been the composition of the proposed transitional government, the Council of State. But an agreement was reached. Three civilian representatives and the three main rebel leaders – Taylor, Kromah, and Boley – were sworn in on August 31. A professor, Wilton Sankawulo, initially chaired the Council. The Council was tasked with implementing the cease-fire agreement, demobilizing all rebels, and holding presidential elections in August/September 1996.

C. Most Recent Crisis

Although there was a great deal of optimism over the August 1995 Abuja Accord, several skirmishes took place in the wake of the agreement. Sustained fighting broke out anew on April 6, 1996, after Liberia's ruling Council of State attempted to arrest faction leader Roosevelt Johnson – who was also the minister of rural development – on murder charges. For 7 weeks, fighting, mainly between Taylor's NPFL and ULIMO-J and its allies raged in Monrovia. Gunmen from both groups looted homes, businesses, and offices of the government, international organizations, and non-governmental aid organizations. Tens of thousands of Liberians fled their homes to escape the fighting; between 10,000 and 20,000 sought refuge in the U.S. embassy's Greystone compound. A truce mediated on April 19 by Ghana and the United States was broken 10 days later. Johnson and his Krahn fighters took

the Barclay Training Center barracks as their base, from which they launched and repelled repeated attacks.

On April 29, after holding talks in Ghana, U.S. Assistant Secretary for African Affairs George Moose went to Monrovia in an attempt to persuade the militia leaders to attend a planned May 8 summit meeting of West African states in Accra, Ghana to discuss salvaging the Abuja Accord; however, his attempts to contact Taylor and Kromah were unsuccessful. The following day, after shots were directed at the U.S. embassy, U.S. Marine guards returned fire, killing three gunmen. One day later, a U.S. amphibious battle group, consisting of four U.S. Navy warships carrying 2,200 marines, arrived in Monrovia harbor to deter an attack on the embassy.


ECOMOG began retaking parts of Monrovia in mid-May, and a fragile peace finally was restored to Liberia when, on May 26, the factions agreed to a cease-fire and ECOMOG stepped up its deployment of troops throughout the capital. Forces loyal to Charles Taylor's NPFL and Alhaji Kromah's ULIMO-K left the city, and the Krahn fighters left the Barclay Training Center barracks.

On May 16, George Boley, a member of Liberia's Council of State, stated that the Council had *not* met to determine whether it should arrest Krahn leader Roosevelt Johnson – the event which touched off the most recent two-month round of fighting and looting. Boley, an ally of Johnson, argued that the attempt to bring in Johnson was a "ploy" designed by Taylor and Kromah to eliminate Johnson as a political force.

In late June, fighting between the ULIMO-J and ULIMO-K factions erupted in the western part of the country, but on July 5, the groups agreed to a cease-fire to permit delivery of relief supplies.

August 1996 was an eventful time for Liberia. Early in the month, most Liberian refugees had left the American embassy compound. In mid-month, the so-called ECOWAS Committee of Nine (C9) member nations (Nigeria, Ghana, Niger, Burkina Faso, Benin, Togo, The Gambia, Cote d'Ivoire, and Mali) met in Abuja to discuss ways to restore and maintain peace in Liberia. On August 17, they agreed to extend the 1995 Abuja accord for another 9 months, until June 15, 1997. In addition, they called for disarmament of the various militia members – at the time estimated at 60,000 – by January 1997, and for elections to be held by May 30, 1997. The summit strongly urged member nations and other countries not to supply arms to Liberian fighters. To prevent violence from breaking out again, the C9 recommended strengthening logistical support for ECOMOG, and beefing up troop strength on the ground in Liberia by 10,000 troops, up from the current 8,500. Perhaps the most practical, effective step taken was to issue warnings to faction leaders that anyone who interfered with the peace implementation process would face personal sanctions and possible trial as a war criminal. Observers note that the threat of such punitive measures is a significant indication of the resolve of neighboring nations to draw Liberia back from chaos.

The following map shows Liberia's Counties and major cities. It is included as a geographical reference for the reader unfamiliar with the country to localize the events and activities described in this report.



D. Developments leading to disarmament

Disarmament and demobilization are part of the larger military and sociopolitical transitional continuum from war to peace, a continuum which includes a cease-fire, the negotiation and signing of Peace Accords, disarmament, demobilization, resettlement, social reintegration and national reconstruction.

While a review of all these components and their elements is beyond the scope of this report, a brief summary of events that directly affected the actual D&D process:

1. Post April 6th, 1996: a cease-fire and Abuja II

The Abuja I Accord (August 19, 1995) was the thirteenth negotiated peace settlement signed during the Liberian conflict and was effectively quashed by the event that led to the latest cease-fire, the April 6th looting of Monrovia. This event heralded a complete breakdown in donor and international organizations' confidence regarding security generated bitter disillusionment in terms of any hope for a peaceful negotiation to end Liberia's civil war.

The Abuja I Accord amended three previous peace agreements³, in which broad procedures and preconditions regarding disarmament and demobilization were set forth. It also brought further political "legitimacy" to the major warlords⁴ by seating them as members on the six-man Council of State and allowing them to run for the projected August 1996 presidential elections.

The Abuja Accord's supplement, the so-called Abuja II (August 17, 1996), came hard on the heels of the traumatic April 6th fighting in Monrovia. Regarding D&D issues, the supplement merely extended the Abuja Agreement but attached a new implementation schedule for D&D (as well as elections).

Included in Abuja II was the proposal for ECOWAS-wide sanctions against persons found guilty of acts capable of obstructing the peace plan⁵. Ms Ruth Perry (who had been unanimously supported by Liberia's fractious Council of State) was designated as the new Chairman of the Council of State of the country's third interim government since the outbreak of war. Subsequently in August, Major-General Victor Malu was appointed as Force Commander on the ECOMOG Peace Keeping Force.

³ *The Cotonou Accord, the Akosombo Agreement, its Accra Clarification, and Abuja I & II*

⁴ *Charles Taylor (NPFL), Charles Boley (LPC) and Alhadiji Kromah (ULIMO-K).*

⁵ *Previous agreements defined what constituted a violation without detailing punitive action other than "prosecution under the laws of Liberia". The international flavor of the sanctions, including war crimes prosecution, was perceived, at least through the D&D process, to give some teeth to Abuja II. This perception was shaken in March 1997 when weapons were uncovered by ECOMOG in the house of the head of the ULIMO-K faction, Alhadiji Kromah, and he was allowed to remain on the ballot.*

2. Disarmament & demobilization

The latest D&D exercise is the result of a longer process that has been continuously hampered by the lack of political will of the factions to disarm and demobilize and the changing or inclusion of new actors in the planning process.

From the Yamoussoukro IV Accord (October 30, 1991) on, all accords contain provisions for the encampment, disarmament and demobilization of the warring factions (although the actual factions multiplied over the years).

The Cotonou Accord (July 25, 1993), the most comprehensive of the Liberian accords, formed the basis of all subsequent agreements (see next section, *Operational Aspects of Demobilization*), and was therefore instrumental in many of the D&D dynamics. The Cotonou Accord thumbnailed out a “disarmament - resettlement - elections” peace formula⁶, called for a UNOMIL mission in-country (to assist in the implementation of encampment, disarmament and demobilization) and, in response to the perception of ECOMOG as a not entirely neutral force, expanded ECOMOG to include troops from outside the region. The Accord also created the LNTG, which was represented by a Council of State whose members were appointed by the factions (thereby setting in motion the eventual domination of the factions’ interests in Liberian politics, culminating in the above-mentioned Abuja Accord).

In March 1994, a D&D process was initiated but broke down due to inter-factional fighting by August. In February of 1995 a Task Force on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DD&R) was formed, comprising UNOMIL, ECOMOG, UN agencies, USAID, EU, NGOs and the LNTG⁷. A new LNTG was installed when the Abuja Accord was signed in August 1995 and the National Disarmament and Demobilization Commission (NDDC) joined the other governmental commissions on the Task Force.

The end of 1995 established UN-HACO with the mandate to coordinate demobilization and the lead into reintegration efforts. The traditional rivalry between UNDPKO and UNHHA has made itself felt in Liberia: it has created and continues to create competition among them for resources (controlled by DPKO); shifting of priorities regarding the D&D process; and continual budget skirmishes. These issues have been exacerbated by the lukewarm response by donors to the UN Consolidated Appeal for the funding of DD&R programs.

⁶ Borrowed from other country experiences (Namibia, Zimbabwe, Angola, Cambodia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Mozambique).

⁷ Represented by the National Readjustment Commission and the LRRRC.

III. The Operational Aspects of Demobilization

A. D&D operations as outlined in the various Accords

In order to understand the eventual outcomes of the November - February D&D process, a review of the key points in the various accords is helpful.

As mentioned, the Cotonou Agreement formed the basis for all subsequent agreements, and specific sections relating to the D&D process are detailed below. The D&D procedures and preconditions set forth at Cotonou and subsequent accords, clarifications and supplements, by and large drew from other countries' experiences. In addition to specific issues regarding D&D operations and those mentioned in the previous section regarding the Cotonou Accords:

The **Akosombo Agreement** (September 12, 1994) was amended to:

- include the collaboration of the LNTG in the supervision and monitoring of the agreement;
- claim the LNTG would, with ECOMOG and UNOMIL collaboration, ensure that all points of entry including sea ports, airfields and roads be monitored and supervised;
- claim that the LNTG would ensure complete freedom of movement throughout ECOMOG and UNOMIL;
- include a section on what constituted a violation of the agreement.

The **Accra Clarification** further amended the Terms and Conditions section to “*facilitate the establishment of Safe Havens and Buffer Zones throughout Liberia in accordance with a plan*”...

1. Disarmament

The Cotonou Accord called for:

- i□ the storage of all collected weapons and warlike materials by ECOMOG under UN Observer verification, with an appropriate recording procedure and inventory;
- ii□ each warring faction to ensure that its combatants report all weapons and warlike materials to ECOMOG (upon proper inventory);
- iii□ all non-combatants in possession of weapons and warlike materials to report and surrender same to ECOMOG, monitored and verified by UN Observers.

The Accord also gave ECOMOG the authority to:

- i□ disarm any combatant in possession of weapons or warlike materials, under UN Observer monitoring;

- ii□ (for the sole purpose of maintaining the cease-fire) to conduct any search or recover lost or hidden weapons, observed and monitored by UN Observers.

a) Subsequent (selected) amendments to the Cotonou Accord's disarmament section:

The Akosombo Agreement was amended to:

- include a statement of the “ultimate objective” of disarmament, “primarily to create a conducive security environment for absolute peace in order to have free and fair elections...” It again mentions the cooperation of the LNTG and mandated the LNTG to begin the formation of “appropriate national security structures to facilitate the disarmament process”, and called for the LNTG (with ECOMOG support) to ensure that “no group or individuals bear arms in the perimeter or the Capital;
- the return of weapons and warlike materials to non-combatants by ECOMOG , after elections;
- include the LNTG's role in observing and monitoring the recovery of lost or hidden weapons.

2. Encampment

According to the Cotonou Accord, the purpose of encampment (established by ECOMOG and monitored/verified by UN Observers), in addition to the disarmament and demobilization, was to serve as transit points for the further education, training and rehabilitation of combatants. Furthermore, the parties agreed to submit (to ECOMOG and UN Observers) a complete listing of their combatants, weapons and warlike materials and their locations to the nearest encampment centers.

Encampment was to start immediately upon ECOMOG and UN Observer deployment, with identification of camps to be made in consultation with the factions. Security was to be provided by ECOMOG and monitored/verified by the UN.

a) Subsequent (selected) amendments to the Cotonou Accord's encampment section:

The Akosombo Agreement was amended to:

- give the factions the responsibility of maintenance of command and control in the encampment centers

3. Demobilization

Based on the Cotonou Accord's Demobilization section:

- non-Liberian fighters or mercenaries would be repatriated by the respective factions, or, if found, expelled from the Republic;
- the parties called upon the UN and international community to “program and finance the process of demobilization, retraining, rehabilitation and re-absorption of all former combatants to normal social and community life;
- each faction was to “immediately commence a community information or educational program, explaining to the public by means of communication devices or any form of media, the essence and purpose of cease-fire, encampment, disarmament and demobilization.”

a) Subsequent (selected) amendments to the Cotonou Accord’s demobilization section:

The Akosombo Agreement was amended to:

- include the LNTG, OAU and ECOWAS in the parties appeal “to design a program which recognizes the peculiarities of the parties and finances the process of demobilization, retraining, rehabilitation and reintegration of all former combatants”;
- give the LNTG additional responsibility for the information and educational campaigns in collaboration with the parties; and
- call for immediate placement of internal security arrangements, including police, customs and immigration, and impart authority to the LNTG for planning the restructuring and training of the AFL (with international assistance).

B. D&D operations as they occurred

1. Preconditions and support

Major components of the projected D&D process outlined in the accords and not implemented included encampment areas, creation of buffer zones⁸ and safe havens in a timely manner, a complete listing of combatants⁹, and the information and educational campaigns.

Additionally, according to the UN-HACO 1996 annual report, the following pre-conditions were not met prior to the commencement of disarmament and demobilization:

⁸ *As per Cotonou: “ECOMOG shall create buffer zones or otherwise seal the borders... to prevent cross-border attacks, infiltration or importation of arms. There shall be deployed UN Observers in all such zones” (emphasis added)*

⁹ *As well as “warlike materials and their locations to the nearest encampment centers.”*

- Presentation of a disarmament plan by UNOMIL and ECOMOG;
- Identification and verification of demobilization sites by UNOMIL, NDDC, and ECOMOG;
- Guaranteed security for demobilization staff and demobilizing fighters;
- Positioning of human and material resources for demobilization, bridging and reintegration; and,
- Approval of the proposed UN-HACO budget for general demobilization and bridging programs.

The same report continues:

"In carrying out the exercise, several problems were faced. Staff were recruited a few hours before departure, and rapidly sent to sites without money or food. Constraints beyond their control prevented UNOMIL from completing the required site evaluations. Completing such would have allowed them to better support deploying personnel with the necessary resources. Deployed personnel found structures to be inadequate or filthy, and with no provision for basic elements of survival, i.e. water, sanitation, accommodation, food, communication and security. At deployed sites, demobilization personnel at times sleep up to eleven persons in rooms without windows or doors. Security for supplies is provided only by the staff members' physical presence in a room. Water continues to be a problem with few containers for collecting and storing water for drinking and cleaning. Camp Naama, Voinjama and Zwedru sites have the additional problem of food scarcity. Demobilization staff did not have any food provided or cash to attempt to purchase what was locally available. Out of necessity and over the objections of WFP, site personnel resorted to eating the food intended for demobilizing combatants.

Sites remain short of tables and chairs. Lack of materials to provide privacy have limited the medical screening process to an interview versus the required physical examination. Essential materials for demobilization such as forms, cameras, and film have been in short supply. Recognizing the importance of the credibility of the operation, HACO approached the U.S. Embassy to identify the need for ID card producing equipment. The U.S. Government agreed to provide two sets of equipment immediately and an additional four have just been delivered. Inability to issue ID cards has precipitated near riots in some sites.

Keeping the sites with resources became a nightmare. Initially, the ECOMOG helicopter assisted in transporting staff and materials to the site. However, soon this assistance ceased on the grounds that UN security rules did not allow UN staff to travel on those helicopters. Furthermore, ECOMOG and Pacific Architectural Engineers (PAE), the company that operates the helicopters, were no longer able to provide space available transport to the UN. The one UN small helicopter could not keep up with the logistical needs of several sites separated by wide distances. In some cases this resulted in remote site staff running out of food and water. Hence, requirements for essential supplies such as water, food, film and coupons were delayed and affected the progress of the work.

These problems emanating from the lack of resources as experienced by both UNDHA-HACO and UNOMIL caught the attention of ECOMOG, factional leaders and the media. They began to criticise the UN publicly. The UN was accused of a lack of preparedness and insincerity to the exercise. They intimated that the UN would be responsible if any failure occurred."

2. Information and educational campaigns about the D&D process

The Cotonou Accords stipulated that each faction was to "immediately commence a community information or educational program, explaining to the public by means of communication devices or any form of media, the essence and purpose of cease-fire, encampment, disarmament and demobilization." The Akosombo Agreement was amended to include the LTNG in this responsibility.

Not only were campaigns not carried out, NGOs and HACO reported misinformation campaigns by the various factions regarding the benefit structure for ex-combatants (specifically, that they were entitled to more), causing confrontations at the D&D sites and isolating the UN and international community as responsible for negligence.

3. D&D sites

At the start of disarmament and demobilization operations (November 22, 1996) seven of the original thirteen sites were open, although in various stages of preparedness: Voinjama, Camp Naama, Zwedru, Buchanan, Camp Schiefflin, Barclay Training Center and Tubmanburg. A week later, Bo Waterside, Kakata and Tappita were opened. By the end of the process, eighteen sites were receiving fighters.

4. The D&D process

The D&D process was to be divided into three phases, with various actors responsible for different stages within the phases. Outlined is what should have happened during the process:

Phase I: Transportation of fighters to D&D site (ECOMOG and PAE)

Phase II: Collection of weapons from fighters (ECOMOG)
Verification of weapon and individual (UNOMIL)

Phase III: Registration, interview, picture taking, Demobilization Card and coupon distribution (UN-HACO) (for child soldiers, this included a UNICEF/SCF interview)
Medical screening

Distribution of rations¹⁰ (WFP)
Transportation of ex-combatants to their destination

What in fact happened varied according to site.

5. Disarmament

Different modalities were used in the disarmament process across the country. In Harper, for example, the Ghanaian battalion did not arrive until December 12, 1996, with HACO and UNOMIL coming onto the scene New Year's Eve. The Ghanaians transported troops to disarmament and demobilization sites in some areas in the southeast, but not to some. In Kanweakhen, bulk collection of weapons were collected from commanders, with individual fighters later arriving in Harper (not the designated D&D site Kanweakhen) for the D&D process; also in Harper, the process at times went more or less according to the phased activity described above.

Criteria for the acceptance of weapons also varied from site to site and from time to time. A UNOMIL observer in Zwedru during the D&D told of continual changing of the goalposts regarding what constituted an acceptable weapon. Initially, all weapons were accepted, regardless of condition or serviceability, and ID cards distributed. After UNOMIL's reporting of its dissatisfaction with these criteria, orders came to accept all weapons but distribute ID cards only if the weapons were serviceable. The result was an immediate upgrading of weapons submitted (a clear indication of the value placed on demobilization ID cards and the perceived benefits thereof).

The issue was not only with weapons but with ammunition as well. Initially, 40 rounds (with or without a weapon) were needed to register as a combatant. This number seemed to be accessible to the general population at large, and was later upped to 100 rounds.

While this site is used as an illustrative example, the team found such inconsistencies mentioned throughout its field trips. In Barclay Training Center, for example, ECOMOG accepted an ornamental cannon, a tear gas canister, a bayonet and a grenade held together by duct tape as "warlike materials"; demobilization cards were given to the bearers of these items. For the BTC D&D site, it should be noted that an estimated 1000 "child soldiers" were in fact merely disadvantaged street children drawn by the promise of scholarships. These children rounded up whatever ordnance in whichever condition so as to pass through the system and be duly accorded cards and the perceived benefits the structure "promised".

6. Demobilization

As mentioned, no encampment areas were utilized for the demobilization process. Therefore, no decompression time, education programs, rehabilitation interventions or in-depth data

¹⁰ Rations included ½ bag of bulgar wheat, 1 can of oil and a tin of fish per combatant.

gathering (for the purposes of further reintegration programming) other than the registration interviews took place.

As far as the team could ascertain, other than the Harper area no transportation of ex-combatants to their destinations occurred. Even here, the destinations appear to be no more than a return to their command structure positions. The immediate result of this was the glaring omission of a key objective of the demobilization process, i.e. the physical separation of the fighter from his unit and command structure.

7. Summary

Disarmament involves the removal of weapons from a faction on both an individual and collective level. The “ultimate objective” of Liberian disarmament, as per the Akosombo Agreement, was to “*create a conducive security environment for absolute peace in order to have free and fair elections in the country...*”. If the Liberian disarmament process is to be evaluated in these terms, then the disarmament phase was a qualified success, despite the inconsistencies in implementation.

Disarmament is the first step toward demobilization. Demobilization’s ultimate goal is to initiate the demilitarization of a faction through severing the military command / control structure and disbanding the “organic” composition of an armed force. According to the Cotonou Accords, and in accordance with other demobilization experiences, the Liberian demobilization plan included encampment “to serve as a transit point for further education, training, and rehabilitation of combatants”. The Demobilization section of the Cotonou Accord further called upon the UN and international community “to program and finance the demobilization, retraining, rehabilitation and re-absorption of all former combatants to normal social and community life¹¹.”

The demobilization process in Liberia thus far is notably lacking in those components, which in other countries have been deemed factors for successful reintegration.

¹¹ In an interesting twist, this was amended in the Akosombo Agreement to read, “to design a program which recognizes the peculiarities of the parties and finances the process...” (emphasis added)


IV. Outcomes of the Demobilization

The results of the disarmament and demobilization activities –as they occurred– will be described from two different perspectives. First, the qualitative results will be presented, indicating the direct outcomes of the activities. These outcomes are driven by several data sources, including demobilization registration mechanisms and interviews with key actors of the disarmament process. Second, a qualitative perspective of the accomplishments of the disarmament is presented based on field interviews held by the team in Monrovia and other locations throughout Liberia. Interview guidelines developed for these meeting and selection criteria for identification of key informant can be found in the appendices under the methodology section.

A. Quantitative outputs of the disarmament

1. The disarmament process

- The Disarmament and Demobilization process comprised a 12-week voluntary disarmament period in 18 locations throughout the country. Fighters identified themselves as members of eight factions with the addition of a small number of armed civilians. However, two factions (NPFL and ULIMO-K) accounted for over 83% for all disarmed personnel, almost 85% of the serviceable weapons, 82% of the unserviceable weapons and 93% of the ammunition collected by ECOMOG.
 - The most important locations based in the inflow of disarming combatants were BTC in Monrovia (3,466 fighters, 17% of total), Voinjama (3,035 fighters, 14.9%), Kakata (2,888 fighters, 14.1%), Gbarnga (2,471 fighters, 12.1%) and Camp Naama (2,317 fighters, 11.4%). These five sites concentrated almost 70% of the total disarmed population.
 - The following map shows the location of disarmament sites and operational deployments for UNOMIL and ECOMOG.



- From the military perspective, the number of weapons turned-in by the combatants, as registered by UNOMIL, do not coincide with the expected figures before disarmament. However, from a qualitative perspective, even the retrieval of these quantities of war materiel seems to indicate a highly effective process¹².

	Serviceable Weapons	Unserviceable Weapons	Ammunition
NPFL	5,261	1,226	188,804
ULIMO-K	1,351	276	949,019
AFL	291	35	11,026
ULIMO-J	305	194	32,583
LPC	503	36	31,492
LDF	86	15	5,376
	7,797	1,782	1,218,300

¹² See next section for specific information about the improvement of security conditions as a direct result of disarmament.

- UNOMIL registration figures for the number of disarmed combatants slightly differs from the humanitarian agency figures (UNDHA-HACO). This was explained to the team as differences in the eligibility criteria for disarmament and/or operational coordination problems.


	Original Estimate ('94)	Revised Estimate ('96)	Actual Registration (2/97)
NPFL	25,000	12,500	11,553
ULIMO-K	12,460	6,800	5,622
AFL	8,734	7,000	571
ULIMO-J	7,776	3,800	1,114
LPC	4,650	2,500	1,223
LDF	750	450	249
	59,370	33,050	20,332

- The following table and chart show the changes in the number of personnel demobilized by the different factions through the disarmament period. It is clearly visible the initial lack of confidence in the demobilization process by the three most important factions (ULIMO-K, ULIMO-J and NPFL) in the low initial number which constantly reduce towards the end of the year.

Demobilization weekly					
Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
11/22/96	1	1899	9.3	9.3	9.3
11/29/96	2	1613	7.9	7.9	17.2
12/06/96	3	1068	5.2	5.2	22.5
12/13/96	4	896	4.4	4.4	26.9
12/20/96	5	313	1.5	1.5	28.4
12/27/96	6	441	2.2	2.2	30.6
01/03/97	7	588	2.9	2.9	33.4
01/10/97	8	1196	5.9	5.9	39.3
01/17/97	9	2573	12.6	12.6	51.9
01/24/97	10	5707	28.0	28.0	79.9
01/31/97	11	3370	16.5	16.5	96.4
02/07/97	12	726	3.6	3.6	100.0
.	.	21	.1	Missing	
Total		20411	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	20390	Missing cases	21		


- The significant and constant increase in the number of fighters voluntarily assisting to the disarmament point throughout the country by the end of 1996, indicated to the team an event or change in the process that made the different factions to re-commit to the demobilization. After several interviews, the team was informed of a high level meeting sponsored by ECOWAS and held between the faction leaders,

ECOMOG, UNOMIL and others. The following chart shows the dramatic results in the disarmament figures after this initiative.



2. Profile of the ex-fighters

- The average ex-fighter presents an average age of slightly over 24 years old. The ranges present in the registration database were from a minimum of 8 years old to a maximum of 78. The most significant segment in these population (quartiles 25 to 75) goes between 17 and 29 years old for 20,550 valid observations.
- The following graph shows the distribution of ages among the demobilized population as registered in early 1997.



- Most of the demobilized soldiers were male (98.7%). Only a small number were female (1.3%). However, special programming considerations should be made for these small groups considering their special characteristics and needs.

- The following table shows the gender distribution among the demobilized fighters

SEX Gender						
Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent	
Male	1	20115	98.5	98.7	98.7	
Female	2	256	1.3	1.3	100.0	
	.	40	.2	Missing		
	Total	20411	100.0	100.0		
Valid cases	20371	Missing cases	40			

- Most of the demobilized fighters have attended school at some point (84.3%). The following table shows school attendance as reported by the demobilizing fighters.


SCHOOL School attendance						
Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent	
No	0	3161	15.5	15.7	15.7	
Yes	1	17036	83.5	84.3	100.0	
	.	214	1.0	Missing		
	Total	20411	100.0	100.0		
Valid cases	20197	Missing cases	214			

- About 60% of all demobilized fighters have been unable to achieve more than elementary education. Close to 22% claim to have attended junior high school and 15% to senior high school. Less than 3% of the total population claims to have some degree of technical or college education. The following table summarizes this data.

EDUC Educational level						
Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent	
None	1	4020	19.7	19.7	19.7	
Elementary	2	8130	39.8	39.8	59.5	
Junior High	3	4622	22.6	22.6	82.2	
Senior High	4	3136	15.4	15.4	97.5	
Technical	5	251	1.2	1.2	98.8	
College	6	252	1.2	1.2	100.0	
	Total	20411	100.0	100.0		

The following chart shows the level of education achieved by the different age ranges in the demobilized fighters.

Younger fighters are less educated than older ones





Demobilizing fighters expressed lengthy periods belonging to a faction. Specific information of the variations among different factions or age ranges was not made available to the team during the assessment. Further studies may provide for additional correlation on the factors associated to the permanence as a faction member.

- Most of the demobilized fighters claimed to have spent five or more years in a faction. This may be perceived as a significant factor affecting the reintegration process since most of the ex-fighters were exposed to a long period of violence and conflict. However, some studies were implemented in other countries transitioning from civil conflict to sustainable peace analyzing the level of difficulty associated with reintegrating ex-combatants in relation to the total time spent exposed to the conflict. The main conclusions show that the combat experience (and the trauma associated with it) obviously creates a complex set of challenges for the combatants' social reintegration that is, however, relatively independent of the total conflict exposure period beyond the first year. Therefore, it was proven that the behavioral/psychological problems for reintegration are about the same for fighters exposed to violence anywhere from two to five or more years.

- The following pie chart shows the distribution of fighters based in their claimed time in the factions.


Most DS spent over 5 years in the factions



- Most demobilized fighters were from Lofa, Bong and Nimba counties (29.3%, 16.0% and 10.8% respectively). These three counties account for over 56% of all demobilized personnel. The following map shows the distribution of densities for the demobilized soldiers based in their reported county of origin.

- The following table and graph show the distribution of demobilized fighters based in their reported County of origin

ORIG	County of origin					
Value	Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Lofa		7	5979	29.3	29.3	29.3
Bong		2	3269	16.0	16.0	45.3
Nimba		11	2194	10.7	10.8	56.1
Grand Bassa		4	1960	9.6	9.6	65.7
Since		13	1398	6.8	6.9	72.6
Maryland		9	966	4.7	4.7	77.3
Cape Mount		3	949	4.6	4.7	82.0
Bomi		1	787	3.9	3.9	85.8
Grand Gedeh		5	735	3.6	3.6	89.4
Margibi		8	707	3.5	3.5	92.9
Grand Kru		6	469	2.3	2.3	95.2
Montserrado		10	462	2.3	2.3	97.5
Rivercess		12	302	1.5	1.5	98.9
Abroad		14	217	1.1	1.1	100.0
.			17	.1	Missing	
Total			20411	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	20394	Missing cases	17			



- Significant numbers of demobilized fighters reported to have lost a parent during the conflict. Close to 43% of the respondents declared not to know about their father. Close to 28% expressed the same about their mother. The following tables summarize the ex-fighters responses to the questions related to their parents' situation.

FATHER Father situation					
Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Don't Know	1	1217	6.0	6.0	6.0
Deceased	2	7505	36.8	36.9	42.9
Alive	3	11616	56.9	57.1	100.0
.	.	73	.4	Missing	
Total		20411	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	20338	Missing cases	73		

MOTHER Mother situation					
Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Don't Know	1	1304	6.4	6.4	6.4
Deceased	2	4333	21.2	21.4	27.8
Alive	3	14658	71.8	72.2	100.0
.	.	116	.6	Missing	
Total		20411	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	20295	Missing cases	116		

- The following cross-tabulation shows that 13% of the total fighter population have lost both of their parents and almost 31% have lost at least one of them. Close to 13% of the demobilized soldiers do not know about the situation of one of their parents and would probably require support for family location and reunification.


FATHER Father situation by MOTHER Mother situation						
		MOTHER				
Count						
Row Pct		Don't Kn Deceased Alive				
Col Pct		ow				Row
Tot Pct		1	2	3	Total	
FATHER						
Don't Know	1	937	70	206	1213	
		77.2	5.8	17.0	6.0	
		71.9	1.6	1.4		
		4.6	.3	1.0		
Deceased	2	229	2632	4623	7484	
		3.1	35.2	61.8	36.9	
		17.6	60.8	31.6		
		1.1	13.0	22.8		
Alive	3	138	1625	9817	11580	
		1.2	14.0	84.8	57.1	
		10.6	37.6	67.0		
		.7	8.0	48.4		
Column		1304	4327	14646	20277	
Total		6.4	21.3	72.2	100.0	
Number of Missing Observations: 134						

- Most of the demobilized soldiers were attending school before the conflict (64% of the total population).
 - The second most important occupation before the conflict as reported by the demobilizing fighters was petty trade or market activities with over 12% of cases.
 - It is interesting that only 9.2% of the demobilized fighters reported to be engaged in farming activities before the conflict. This figure seems to be particularly low considering the rural origin of this population.
 - The following table summarizes the ex-fighters' activities before their involvement in the armed conflict.


PREV_ACT Previous occupation					
Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Attended School	3	12796	62.7	63.8	63.8
Petty Trade/Market	15	2449	12.0	12.2	76.0
Farming	8	1846	9.0	9.2	85.2
Employed	7	1796	8.8	9.0	94.2
Army	2	354	1.7	1.8	95.9
Mechanic	11	165	.8	.8	96.8
Driver	6	158	.8	.8	97.5
Apprentice	1	109	.5	.5	98.1
Unemployed	19	109	.5	.5	98.6
Other	14	72	.4	.4	99.0
Carpenter	5	46	.2	.2	99.2
Nothing	13	44	.2	.2	99.4
Tailor	17	31	.2	.2	99.6
Mining	12	27	.1	.1	99.7
Self employed	16	18	.1	.1	99.8
Teacher	18	13	.1	.1	99.9
Business	4	10	.0	.0	99.9
Fishing	9	7	.0	.0	100.0
Mason	10	7	.0	.0	100.0
.		354	1.7	Missing	
Valid cases		20057			
Total		20411	100.0	100.0	
Missing cases		354			

3. Characteristics of the factions


- The most important factions from the numeric strength perspective were the NPFL with 11,870 or 58% of the total demobilized soldiers; followed by the ULIMO-K with 5,042 combatants or 25% of the total.
 - The following pie chart shows the distribution of demobilized fighters among the different factions. It is important to mention that UNHHA-HACO did not consider many of the AFL members as officially demobilized and therefore are not included in this representation.




- The following chart shows the percentile distribution of fighters by origin for each of the most important factions. This shows that fighters from almost every region in Liberia composed these groups.



- It is clear that the five most important factions have similar characteristics when one compares age ranges and dispersions among those voluntarily disarmed. Ages range between 10 and 40 years old with a median around 21 to 24 years old. The bulk of this population is in the 17 to 27 year range. This should be taken into consideration for future programming consideration.
 - A special note should be made in relation to the AFL. This group originated in the “official” Liberian army and as such, their age ranges are much higher than the other factions.
 - The following chart shows the age distribution for each of the registered groups at demobilization time, including factions and other special groups.




- As mentioned in the beginning of this section, demobilization rates varied significantly during the disarmament period. There has been much speculation about the factions using children (some of them non-combatant street children) to increase the numbers of personnel going through the demobilization process. The following chart shows the proportion of children demobilized by each faction during the demobilization period in relation to the number of adult fighters.




- It is clear from the above chart that only the LPC shows significant variations in the proportion of children vs. adult fighters demobilized during the process. This chart indicates that considering the small number of troops demobilized by the LPC (only 7% of the total), the manipulation of children to replace adult fighters did not play a major factor in the overall demobilization process.
- Almost all demobilized soldiers reported to belong to the Christian or Muslim religions. The following table shows this representation.

RELIG Reported religion					
Value	Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent Cum Percent
Other		1	405	2.0	2.0 2.0
Muslim		2	4044	19.8	20.1 22.1
Christ.		3	15712	77.0	77.9 100.0
.		.	250	1.2	Missing
		Total	20411	100.0	100.0
Valid cases		20161	Missing cases		250


- The following chart shows the religious composition for each of the factions. As expected, the higher proportion of Muslims is present in the ULIMO-K faction due to their Mandingo ethnic origin.




- The following map represents the approximate location or area of influence of the different ethnic groups in Liberia. This is provided as a reference to the ethnic origin of different factions and their respective geographical strongholds.




- The following chart below illustrates the rank and file composition as reported by the demobilizing fighters for each of the most important factions.
 - The graph shows in a 100% scale for each faction the percentile distribution for each rank bracket.
 - Only the AFL shows a distribution comparable with a regular army. This is explained by their origins as the “official” Liberian army and therefore the formal training of their ranks.
 - All other factions show a complete disproportion among the number of officers and senior officers. According to several observers, the rank system was more related to personal relationships and specific military actions used by the factions that fit into their advancement criteria. Therefore, a young fighter taking specific actions against “enemies” would be awarded the rank of captain, or a combatant connected to the leadership and able to organize a fighting group around him, would then be call “Colonel”. As explained to the team by different sources, the ranking system in most factions is more a representation of how combatants called themselves because of military prestige than the actual indication of a vertical hierarchy.



- Three factions seem to have regulated the disarmament and demobilization process by monitoring each others actions. The NPFL, ULIMO-K and LPC clearly follow the same trend in relation to the proportion of their respective sizes demobilized during the process.




- The following map shows the approximate areas of control for each of the factions. The most important “borders” are among the ULIMO-K/NPFL and the LPC/NPFL areas, showing that the previous analysis follows the tactical situation on the ground.



4. The expectations of the ex-fighters


- A significant number of demobilized fighters expressed intentions to go, or stay in Monrovia after disarmament (7,085 fighters, 37% of total population)¹³. This is a significant trend considering that only 2.3% of the demobilized population are originally from Montserrado County.




- The following map suggests a strong interest in the demobilized to move into Monrovia. Further exploration of the data available to the team showed a strong relationship between the expressed expectations for destinations and demobilization site/county of origin¹⁴. This indicates to the team that the intended destinations are more a representation of “wishes” at the time of disarmament rather than a conscious decision to relocate to Monrovia. Previous education, past activities, family situation, ages or intended future activities after demobilization were not influencing factors in the fighters’ selection of destinations. For these reasons, information representing intended destinations should only be considered as an indication of the trend present at demobilization time and not as a highly reliable representation of the current location of the demobilized soldiers.

¹³ This figure includes about 1,000 children registered in Monrovia who were not necessarily active fighters.

¹⁴ A factorial analysis was applied to the dataset in order to assess for potential correlation between different parameters of the ex-fighter profile and their intended destination. Only two factors were proven to have relevance on the decision for destination. These factors were the county of origin and the site where the fighter was demobilized.



- Driven by the extremely high proportion of ex-fighters declaring interest in relocating in the Montserrado County, the team analyzed the changes in the numbers opting for this location through the disarmament period and by faction. The following chart shows these results.
- When asked about their perception of activities after demobilization, most fighters




expressed interest to return to school or continue further education.

- The following table and chart summarizes the distribution of responses from demobilizing fighters in relation to their expectations for activities post-disarmament.

EXPECT	Expected occupation				Valid	Cum
Value	Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Percent	Percent
1	Attend School	1	10509	51.5	51.9	51.9
7	Learn a Trade	7	5298	26.0	26.1	78.0
6	Farming	6	1200	5.9	5.9	83.9
2	Business	2	1061	5.2	5.2	89.2
3	Civil Work	3	1050	5.1	5.2	94.4
8	Military	8	432	2.1	2.1	96.5
9	Petty Trade	9	320	1.6	1.6	98.1
11	Others	11	174	.9	.9	98.9
5	Employment	5	131	.6	.6	99.6
10	Vocational	10	75	.4	.4	99.9
4	Don't know	4	11	.1	.1	100.0
.		.	150	.7	Missing	
Total			20411	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases		20261		Missing cases		150

- The extremely low number of responses indicating interest in vocational training made the team suspect a methodological problem in the registration mechanism. Examining the registration forms used throughout the process and interviewing key informants during the field visits, the team realized that most of the answers declaring interest in attending to school are in fact reflecting interest in vocational or technical training.



- The following cross-tabulation shows the expected activity for the demobilized soldiers versus their educational level.

EXPECT Expected occupation by EDUC Educational level									
		EDUC							
		Count							
		Row Pct	None	Elementa	Junior H	Senior H	Technica	College	
		Col Pct		ry	igh	igh	l		Row
			1	2	3	4	5	6	Total
EXPECT									
Attend School	1		924	5182	2576	1611	78	138	10509
			8.8	49.3	24.5	15.3	.7	1.3	51.9
			23.5	64.0	55.9	51.7	31.2	55.0	
Business	2		367	304	214	133	17	26	1061
			34.6	28.7	20.2	12.5	1.6	2.5	5.2
			9.3	3.8	4.6	4.3	6.8	10.4	
Civil Work	3		386	198	193	218	35	20	1050
			36.8	18.9	18.4	20.8	3.3	1.9	5.2
			9.8	2.4	4.2	7.0	14.0	8.0	
Don't know	4		8	3					11
			72.7	27.3					.1
			.2	.0					
Employment	5		47	32	23	23	5	1	131
			35.9	24.4	17.6	17.6	3.8	.8	.6
			1.2	.4	.5	.7	2.0	.4	
Farming	6		653	239	127	144	18	19	1200
			54.4	19.9	10.6	12.0	1.5	1.6	5.9
			16.6	3.0	2.8	4.6	7.2	7.6	
Learn a Trade	7		1279	1897	1260	778	72	12	5298
			24.1	35.8	23.8	14.7	1.4	.2	26.1
			32.5	23.4	27.3	25.0	28.8	4.8	
Military	8		86	69	103	133	13	28	432
			19.9	16.0	23.8	30.8	3.0	6.5	2.1
			2.2	.9	2.2	4.3	5.2	11.2	
Petty Trade	9		114	110	66	26	2	2	320
			35.6	34.4	20.6	8.1	.6	.6	1.6
			2.9	1.4	1.4	.8	.8	.8	
Vocational	10		29	12	11	22	1		75
			38.7	16.0	14.7	29.3	1.3		.4
			.7	.1	.2	.7	.4		
Others	11		47	47	36	30	9	5	174
			27.0	27.0	20.7	17.2	5.2	2.9	.9
			1.2	.6	.8	1.0	3.6	2.0	
Column			3940	8093	4609	3118	250	251	20261
Total			19.4	39.9	22.7	15.4	1.2	1.2	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 150

B. D&D immediate qualitative results

The following summary findings represent qualitative opinions and viewpoints from key informants as collected by the team on field visits and in Monrovia. Summary guidelines used for these interviews can be found in the methodology appendix.

1. Disarmament

- Eligibility criteria for disarmament changed over time. Started with the delivery of a serviceable weapon, continued with any weapon, later only about 100 rounds of ammunition and finalized with almost all individuals demobilized regardless of eligibility.
- Not all the interviewees were satisfied with mechanics of disarmament viz. numbers of weapons and quality. Once criteria was revised (only serviceable weapons accepted) the overall quality of the process improved.
 - Disarmament not too successful in some major cities, perhaps 70% as opposed to 85% in Monrovia. People are not entirely forthcoming about arms caches, since they are generally sympathetic to a particular faction.
 - During D&D, ammunition may have been bought in order to get demobilization identification cards and benefits. Not all registered personnel may reflect actual combatants.
- Not all the DS had weapons. The actual combatants are not as many as it was thought. Most of them were effectively disarmed.
- Commanders were controlling the flow of the demobilization process. They were in charge of selecting who was demobilized and when that would happen.
- Incentives were not necessarily attractive for all the demobilized soldiers. Some rejected the food support after demobilization claiming that they had not fought for that; it was ECOMOG's ultimatum that motivated disarmament
- Some fighters were requested to turn in their weapons to the local commander before demobilization. This indicates the potential for arms caches and by extension made them ineligible for disarmament and benefits.

2. Demobilization

- The disarmament process did affect the command structure, with the message "the nonsense is over". However, relationships among ranks are still in place.
 - Civilians now have the attitude, "you are now at my level". This also true among the ex-fighters, reports of trouble amongst them signifies the breakdown of this structure.

- DS have been in their areas for long. Demobilization did not create a physical separation of forces and DS stayed where they operated.
- Most ex-fighters are not from the area, but want to remain for a variety of reasons (fear of returning home due to confrontation of parents, dead relatives, because of atrocities committed there) but “our people have accepted them”.
- Ranks were based on actions. For instance, destroying a village would make the fighter a colonel. Ranks do not represent a real army hierarchy.
 - Platoons were geographically focussed
 - Recruits were used for support functions graduating later to carry a weapon.
 - Rank structure represents more of a perception of themselves than a real military hierarchy.
- Reasons for joining factions:
 - Revenge
 - Personal benefit
 - Peer pressure
 - Criminal intent
- It is important to reduce the faction’s control over the populations by providing them with economic independence. It is also important to provide food security and economic options for the DS in order to draw personnel resources from the control of factions leaders.

3. The ex-fighters attitude

- Levels of aggression among DS are increasing and more requests for assistance are being received. Requests include education/training, business support, agriculture seeds/tools and information about the new army.
- Ex-fighters had high expectations, but were given “empty promises” and have not faced reality. During the war, their whole life and activities centered around looting and money; this scheme has been replaced with inactivity and privation
- Ex-fighters are disillusioned and disappointed. They think they have been misled. The disappointment is due to their perception upon D&D that they would be employed...they were persuaded to come in from the bush to town and receive incentives to resettle... now they see only “empty promises”
- During the war they had the means to fend for themselves and were supplied. In rural areas ex-fighters were easily recognized. In cities they are harder to discern unless grouped in gangs.

- Ex-fighters still troublesome, do not understand what D&D means, go about in groups, attitude problems, theft still an issue, they just roam about.
- Food is an incentive for them.
- Drugs a real problem still, they get enough for the day then hang out at the video business or liqueur store.
- Food distribution in villages reveals the civilian/ex-fighters dynamics...initially civilians were angry with ex-fighters, but now see them as just other people. This dynamic further revealed by civilians standing up to ex-fighters, something unheard of during the war.
- The ex-fighters are traumatized. They require special treatment and programs which address their special status. The potential for perceiving programs as rewards is far less threatening than the risk they represent to the society.
- Ex-fighter groupings are breaking down; many tradesmen among demobilized soldiers; jobs/opportunities are perceived as more important than factional loyalty.

4. Security conditions

- ECOMOG is across-the-board perceived as the main guarantor of peace and security.
 - ECOMOG is considered the main guarantor of security (responsible “for all threats to life and property”). ECOMOG has ceded other authority to civilians, apparently good relations. If ECOMOG left, civilians would lose this authority and probably flee.
- Disarmament was a complete security improvement success. If arms caches exist, they could last from two to a maximum of five years depending on the storage conditions. Indications from the D&D process show reasonably maintained weapons and ammunition in original packaging.
- Demobilization and disarmament effectively improved the security situation. Fewer weapons available make the ex-fighters less threatening.
- Few incidents since demobilization. Mostly rejection by civilians returning and the DS being used to have free food/things. This “demanding” attitude is decreasing.
- The demobilization and reintegration process is incomplete (referring to the reintegration portion). Sierra Leone has gone with the same approach and held elections without complete demobilization. The situation there today reflects the potential dangers for Liberia’s future.
- LPC and ULIMO-J least disciplined; NPFL had good command/control, with highest and fastest remobilization potential.
 - Remobilization capacity is in many cases still intact. If opportunities are created for DS, some could be drawn from the command structure and thus complicate remobilization.

- Would be easy for ex-fighters to remobilize, although they do not gather together, they keep communication with their peers.
- General population rapidly increasing. Mostly returns by internally displaced and refugees.
- Local economies much more monetarized and lots of commercial activity restarting.

5. General impressions

- People are in general optimistic about the peace process and expect peace to hold. Security conditions have greatly improved. For instance, only after demobilization, people can travel safely and move freely.
- Ex-fighters still using their rough ways of doing things, still aggressive, still loud and still the same. On the average, none are behaving better. “They just don’t have the weapons so people don’t worry about them as much or as immediately because they can’t kill you”
 - Those few who have found their families in Monrovia are behaving better.
- The most significant changes perceived after disarmament and ECOMOG deployment are:
 - 1 ☐ increased security,
 - 2 ☐ more business,
 - 3 ☐ better freedom of movement,
 - 4 ☐ transportation started to reappear,
 - 5 ☐ increased agricultural production, and
 - 6 ☐ schools reinitiating classes.
- Most of the initiatives are being delayed for after the elections. Time is being wasted for today’s needs.

6. Existing programs

- Civilian Reconstruction Teams (CRTs) were appropriate in the beginning of the D&D but were far too few when compared with the DS population. Never complemented with sustainable reintegration efforts.
- The CRTs have been positive in that they keep the ex-fighters busy, but they do not employ enough ex-fighters. Today, ex-fighters’ attitudes are disruptive and not conducive to earning a wage or holding a job. They claim they want skills and jobs. However, not all the DS have hostile attitudes. Most of the demands and attitude problems are associated to the lack of opportunities.
- CRTs are good temporary measure but not enough to support reintegration.
 - No amount of food will solve the Liberian conflict.

- Not lasting, not meaningful either, but they have their place
- There is not enough support for micro-businesses for the DS. Many are being attracted into Monrovia by the city lifestyle and illusions of easy money.

7. Recommendations for programs

- Interesting activities to initiate in highly factionalized areas are: 1) Short term massive labor intensive activities like cash for work programs; 2) For the mid/long term it is fundamental to reestablish the traditional industry and regenerate jobs.
- Demobilized soldiers should be targeted for special programs even if that creates the impression of “privileged” treatment. They are a traumatized group and special programs should target their special needs.
 - The issue of providing benefits to ex-fighters, rewarding them and angering civilians has not been the case in Liberia because citizens view the process of ex-combatants receiving benefits or privileged entitlements as a necessary intervention for the good of the whole society:
- It is important to support the local administrations in order to regain civilian control at the local level.
- Counseling is very important. Lack of opportunities may force the DS into banditry. Need to be refocused into activities that are more productive.
- Reintegration is a community responsibility. Something new needs to be incorporated in their minds.

V. Recommendations for programming

Liberia's current conditions suggest that a dual strategy for supporting the reintegration of demobilized soldiers into civil society is most promising. Firstly, the human capital of ex-combatants needs to be built up through education and training, presenting an intermediary stage of transition for the majority of veterans. Secondly and in parallel, an NGO-led provision of low-skill labor-intensive jobs through public works and micro-projects is warranted for the immediate term. Following the forthcoming elections, such development activities as increased production, roads, health, education and sanitation improvements are the next logical building blocks in the nation's transition from war to peace.

Led by UNDHA-HACO, the international community has already made explicit promises for programs to the demobilized. These intentions were articulated during the disarmament and demobilization process in the form of coupons delivered to the ex-fighters for access to future reintegration benefits.

Beyond these well-intended promises, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are presently the best-positioned delivery system for rehabilitation and reconstruction throughout the country, especially in the rural areas. Many are currently evaluating the transition from emergency relief to rehabilitation and reconstruction, and are now planning for a variety of basic community infrastructure programs ranging from feeder road repair, micro-enterprise (income generation) promotion, and small-scale family agriculture. At the same time, they are working (when possible) with local governments, and, therefore, can readily build local capacity through the provision of formal training and non-formal apprenticeship modalities.

A. Design considerations

In light of the findings of this study, the team recommends that attention be paid to those factors, which impact on the success of reintegration programs but do not necessarily fall under their mandates. For this reason it is advisable to enter into reintegration programming knowing that risks may be caused by extraneous factors to reintegration programming and these risks should be accommodated during the planning stages to avoid DS false expectations. Such risks should also inform decision-makers about the types of assistance required to ensure peaceful reintegration, which might include assisting Governments or Agencies to fulfill their commitments.

Political interventions have also been found to be outside of reintegration mandates yet have varying degrees of hindrance to successful reintegration programming. For example, the presence of double local administrations disallows programming to be coordinated with local authorities since both parties may be claiming responsibility for certain geographic areas or changes in newly appointed positions for local authorities do not occur prior to programming implementation.

In addition, long term development needs (especially infrastructure such as roads, schools, water facilities, health clinics, electricity, etc) should be considered when planning reintegration programs. These needs can either be incorporated into reintegration programming objectives or considered from the outset as obstacles to implementation particularly to rural outreach programs.

Finally, local community unrest (e.g. resettlement of other vulnerable groups, general increase in crime) should be factored into reintegration planning. Furthermore, the DS should not be targeted as potential criminals but rather viewed as a group that will be returning to potentially higher crime areas.

1. Maintaining realistic expectations

The team found that in almost all demobilization and reintegration scenarios throughout the world, the only incidents of dissatisfaction among the DS, were caused by the non-delivery of real or perceived demobilization or reintegration entitlements. Cases where DS raised their voices in protest occurred when they were not able to access their benefits (e.g. pensions, Government subsidies, packages or reintegration vouchers) or perceived that a particular programming deliverable was an entitlement. These were the cases that hindered the smooth transition for the DS. It was found that the DS themselves were not initiating discontentment by demanding something outside of what was due them. This is a vital factor for the transition period and all reintegration programs. It must be clearly articulated how and whether DS will benefit to avoid dissatisfaction among the DS through misinformation or failure to deliver goods or services.

2. Structuring reintegration programming delivery

If one considers the mechanisms used in other countries, it is clear that a decentralized delivery model is the most effective alternative. This implies that no single implementing organization (although all under one directive or coordinating unit) take responsibility for reintegration. Instead, successful implementation of all reintegration programs should be assumed by all the programming partners. There are strengths and weaknesses associated with this model which need to be considered.

a) Strengths

The major strength to the decentralized approach is that programs are very flexible and accountable only to the implementing organization's funder/s. This means that programming might offer more options, be implemented more quickly (avoiding centralized decision making and bureaucracies) and potentially reach more DS. Given the limitations of infrastructure support in Liberia, this model offers an implementing agency driven program. This model also fosters contracting of various agencies for implementation.

b) Weaknesses

The major weakness of this approach is clearly demonstrable by the lack of a comprehensive database and documentation system which can show the various components of reintegration, how they succeeded and the obstacles they faced. One must obtain reports from various agencies, formatted and compiled in various manners, in order to derive any conclusions about the overall design and implementation. It is clear that the lack of coordinated efforts negatively effects the DS since programming modification, extension or termination is based on a single organization's preference or funding capability rather than based on the identified needs of the DS. A centralized model, where a single implementer or donor holds DS information data, selects the optimal reintegration program for a specific DS, and then ensures delivery of that service, might offer a more comprehensive approach.

3. Information management

As stated above, the need for a comprehensive database is essential to track, monitor and measure the reintegration processes and results. This means that implementing agencies must mandate that information be gathered and documented regularly. A centralized database, as opposed to agency specific databases, would allow for a much more comprehensive and much easier method of reporting. The major objectives of such a database are twofold:

A tool to better assist DS : The major objective of the database is to inform implementing agencies about the needs and programming options for DS. The database should allow programs to address DS requests and problems to eliminate false expectations and lack of delivery of project goods or services.

A reporting mechanism for Governments and Donors : Another objective is to keep Governments and donors apprised on the current reintegration status and opportunities and obstacles faced by the DS which might hinder the process of maintaining sustainable peace. Implementing agencies should clearly articulate the intended use of such a database and not confound its purpose or limit its use.

B. Suggested interventions**1. Processing data on registered demobilized fighters**

Given the unevenness of the D&D process to date, with its lack of encampment sites and the opportunity to begin the process of civilianization, the lack of transport of ex-fighters out of their spheres of military control, and the lack of forward linkages to reintegration programs for ex-combatants, the team recommends that USAID further examine the data available on the registered demobilized fighters.

In order to get a fuller understanding of the factions' compositions and structures, it is recommended that technical, logistical and clerical assistance be provided to UNOMIL to process the thousands of disarmament registration forms currently on hardcopy. UN-HACO has a database of information that gives a partial picture of those individuals registered at D&D sites. It would be very helpful to crosscheck this information with a UNOMIL database (taken from the preliminary intake form, military to military) to inform programming for ex-combatants (if necessary) in the future. Also, the NDDC claims they have pre-registration surveys of combatants on hand; this opportunity might also be explored further.

2. Specific programming considerations

From a programming perspective, there is little USAID can do if all-out conflict resurfaces. If elections are held and the results respected, a number of scenarios can be speculated upon but are of little help in programming due to the wide range of presidential aspirants, the unpredictability of how the winner might go about consolidating his/her political base, and the international community's response to the possible electoral victory by a warlord.

Nonetheless, planning for known opportunities in the short-term (pre- and immediately post-elections) is possible. A program that is regionally targeted and flexible with built-in, quick response mechanisms that can work through civilian structures and address local needs (whether targeting ex-fighters or not) is needed despite the electoral outcome uncertainties.

A pilot "County Fund" approach for USAID assistance is recommended. Counties which might be targets for assistance, due to the current USAID funding trends and based on potential for future conflict, include Bomi, Lofa, and Nimba.

a) Goals and objectives of a County Fund Program

The County Fund's mission would be to design and implement, in partnership with NGOs and local communities, a series of strategic rural revitalization projects in war-devastated communities. While couched in relief-to-development terms, the Fund could also be utilized for quick-impact "pacification" projects in those areas where ex-fighters are deemed a threat to peace and stability.

The County Fund's goal would be to foster community initiatives, reinforce civilian social structures, provide incentives for returning populations and create a stable foundation for the return of demobilized soldiers and their families. The Fund would address the resettlement, reintegration and development needs continuum through an approach that works through civilian structures at the local level, enabling these structures and community members to prioritize needs and develop responses appropriate to their lives. Community Revitalization Projects (CRPs) would be the mechanisms used to do this.

CRPs in the three program areas would be designed to support specific Strategic Objectives:

- I. *The program objective of resettlement would be to improve community stability, represented by:*
 - perceived potential for a better quality of life
 - improved community spirit
 - improved perception of security
 - increasing reconciliation and tolerance
- II. *The program objective of reintegration would be to rehabilitate community social infrastructure, represented by:*
 - increased citizen participation
 - improved and / or availability of basic services
 - improved community accessibility
 - strengthened local civilian government / leadership
- III. *The program objective of development needs would be to revitalize traditional farm-to-market economic patterns, represented by:*
 - increased self-sufficiency
 - restored market forces
 - restored informal sector

Each county would target communities, with their own “rolling design” strategy (target area strategies) for socioeconomic revitalization. The strategies would consist of a series of interventions designed to take into account and revitalize community initiative, productivity and trading patterns (whether active, weak or moribund), road access, social trends, authority structures and social infrastructure. Projects would fall into four sectors: agricultural productivity, community infrastructure, schools & training, and micro-enterprise.

b) Target Areas & CRPs

Taken as a whole within the continuum of the three program areas of resettlement, reintegration and development needs, a target area strategy (TAS) should contribute to a change in social interaction: movement of goods and people, productivity cycles, trading patterns, a shift to a more effective, participatory civilian leadership, greater confidence self-reliance and active community involvement in their future.

By implication, CRPs have a built-in potential for spin-off interventions and expansion at the local level. To effectively revitalize an area's economy, it might be necessary to launch a series of linking activities (e.g., tools and technology for tillage, hybrid seed distribution, farmer training, bridge rehabilitation, small-scale processing and/or storage of crops). The agricultural cycles have downtime which might be utilized for public works projects that foster community initiative, confidence and self-reliance.

c) *Development of a TAS*

Community assessments would need be participatory and include both formal and informal interviewing methodologies. They are geared toward community-specific projects that enable individuals and communities to respond to developmental needs, with an eye to returning populations (including the demobilized and their families).

Once an area is surveyed and identified as a potential target area, the community would elect a *Community Work Group* - community members who help develop, design and ultimately implement CRPs.

Projects would be executed with the community in partnership with existing implementing agencies or in anticipation of future linkages. Implementation and selection criteria might include:

- rural-based activity with a high potential for population growth due to resettlement of both returnees and demobilized soldiers;
- interventions that represent potential for considerable expansion, whether in the community or in a larger geographical area;
- communities and projects that offer potential for later stage income generation or job creation projects;
- projects that will integrate at a district level and have a collective impact on the targeted county;
- interventions that support traditional economic pursuits, utilize as many community-supplied resources as possible, and are based on field assessments carried out in conjunction with the community for enhancing productivity and quality of life (agriculture, animal husbandry, health, education, microenterprise development, water, roads);
- community planning and implementation at the community or district level, utilizing established civilian structures; and,
- absorption capacity of the selected regions and relative efficiency and effectiveness of the intervention as measured in terms of the relationship of cost to impact

d) *Issues concerning County Fund design and implementation*

The following is needed to undertake successful design and implementation of a County Fund:

- the identification of an organization that would serve as an umbrella agency in the setting and monitoring of Fund policy guidelines, identification of NGO partners, technical assistance throughout a CRP's process (from target area strategy to proposal vetting to CRP implementation), some logistical support (perhaps), and financial disbursement and oversight;

- the integration of the pilot County Fund into a national reintegration plan;
- adequate levels of funding to provide for a flexible and responsive mechanism which can respond to many of today's "empty promises".

More detailed information about Target Area Strategies and Community Revitalization Projects can be found in the appendices.

C. Recommendations for further activities/studies

The team recommends further exploration or future studies to address the following issues:

- Feasibility of risk mapping and security monitoring.
- Situation and special needs for the war wounded and disabled. Recommendations for special programming, rehabilitation and reintegration.
- Feasibility study for the implementation of a County Fund.

VI. Team Conclusions

Disarmament is the first step toward demobilization. Demobilization's ultimate goal is to demilitarize a faction through severing the military command and control structure and disbanding the "organic" composition of an armed force. According to the Cotonou Accords, and in accordance with other (not always successful) demobilization experiences, the Liberian demobilization plan included encampment "to serve as a transit point for further education, training, and rehabilitation of said combatants". The Demobilization section of the Cotonou Accord further called upon the UN and international community "to program and finance the demobilization, retraining, rehabilitation and re-absorption of all former combatants to normal social and community life."

Unstated mechanisms of demobilization, again drawing from other D&D experiences, included registration and processing for an identification card, an interview which collects information for prioritization and targeting programming alternatives to a violent livelihood (and thereby contribute to the severance of ex-combatant dependence on a military structure). Also included was a medical screening process to treat those cases that could not be resolved at the D&D site, with a competent medical diagnosis.

In Liberia, the demobilization and disarmament process did not intend to fracture the command structure in the fighting factions. It only provided for another "accomplished" milestone or checkmark in the peace process. The real objective of the activity seems to gravitate more toward the goal of moving forward the national election agenda, than to support country pacification. The role of the observer forces in the registration did not include verification of the actual reduction of the factions fighting capacity. This particular exercise can be compared more to a weapons "buy-back" program than to a traditional demobilization process (although without the payment for the weapons but a political incentive to the factions' leadership).

However, the security conditions in Liberia have significantly improved since the D&D exercise. Demobilization and disarmament effectively improved the perception around the benefits of peace in the general population. Fewer weapons available make the ex-fighters less threatening and there have been very few incidents since disarmament.

There exists in the general population a cautious optimism for the upcoming elections and their results. The newfound security in the country facilitates this optimism. Whether this security is the result of disarmament or a honeymoon period in which the faction leaders are biding their time in anticipation of the polls remains to be seen.

Although there are a number of on-going programs for bridging Liberia's communities from war to peace, these initiatives suffer from the lack of over-all strategic planning and an integrated approach. Reasons for this include: the factionalization, incapacity and lack of transparency of the LTNG and consequent lack of confidence in it by the international community; a lukewarm response to the UN's Consolidated Appeal for the funding of demobilization, resettlement and reintegration programs; the INGO's Joint Policy of

Operations (in light of April 1996) which adopted a cautious approach to capital asset investment and distribution of assistance; and rivalries within the UN agencies.

From a programming perspective, there is little USAID can do if all-out conflict resurfaces. If elections are held and the results respected, a number of scenarios can be speculated upon but are of little help in programming due to the wide range of presidential aspirants and their proven unpredictability. USAID should therefore program for known opportunities in the short-term (pre- and immediately post-elections) and implement a program that is regionally targeted and flexible with built-in, quick response mechanisms.

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Ap - A. Approved scope of work

Liberia Disarmament and Demobilization Assessment of Effectiveness

Scope of Work

Title: Assessment of the Effectiveness of Disarmament and Demobilization in Liberia

Time: Three weeks (May 24 – June 14 1997)

Goal: To achieve a more solid understanding of the effectiveness of the disarmament and demobilization operations so far undertaken in order to design appropriate interventions to enhance the peace process.

Objectives:

- (a) To determine the outcome of the disarmament and demobilization operations that were carried out in Liberia between November 1996 and February 1997.
- (b) To assess the impact of the disarmament and demobilization on the present security conditions in Liberia.
- (c) To identify areas for interventions activities to improve the security conditions and support national reintegration efforts.
- (d) To establish a security monitoring system to track potential flash points of conflicts.

Rationale:

Liberia's security situation has improved substantially in the course of the first three months of 1997. Many observers, however, continue to doubt whether the improvement stems from real changes in the ability of the factions to return to war or whether it is merely a result of a short-term desire of the factions to play along with the peace process.

The security situation has a substantial impact on the planning and implementation of post-war reintegration activities. A better understanding of the effectiveness of the demobilization process that officially ended on January 31, 1997 would help assess whether or not Liberian society is any less militarized now than it was at the start of the peace process – How secure is the current situation? A better understanding of who did and didn't demobilized, and of what are they doing now, would also help to establish whether special needs exist where the demobilized combatants are concerned, given the decision not to provide ex-fighters with special benefits. In addition, a security monitoring system

would allow for recognizing flash point of tensions which could undermine reintegration activities and the peace process.

Structure of the mission:

The mission comprises three phases:

Phase I (Monrovia, 3-5 days):

Phase I is made up of two activities that would run concurrently. The first activity is to analyze the different sets of data (ECOMOG, UNOMIL and UN-HACO) that were collected during the demobilization process. The aim of this number-crunching exercise is to establish what data actually exists, determine consistencies and discrepancies between the various sets of data, and detect trends that may not be obvious at first analysis.

The second activity is a political assessment of which areas are more volatile. The assessment will determine a number of scenarios around the resumption of violence. These scenarios will serve as a basis for the selection of areas that present a high potential for renewed conflict and that the team would investigate further.

Phase II (Monrovia and up-country, 12-14 days):

Phase II concentrates on the collection of additional data. The search for additional data will focus on two elements (1) interviews with key ECOMOG, UNOMIL, UN-HACO and NGO staff and groups of ex-combatants in Monrovia and in, if not all, at least a majority of the thirteen demobilization center areas; and (2) a more in-depth security assessment of the two to three high-risk areas as determined by the political assessment carried out in phase I. Methods for data gathering will consist of interviews with key informants and focus groups. The data collected will be essentially qualitative (because of time constraints, the team will rely on the qualitative and quantitative data collected at the time of demobilization as baseline).

Phase III (Monrovia, possibly Washington DC, 4-5 days)

Phase III is the analysis and report-writing phase. The report is to provide recommendations to include at least two kinds of actions: 1) follow-up research and 2) program interventions. Furthermore this phase will include debriefings for the USAID/Embassy staff in Monrovia as well as USAID/State in Washington, DC, and possibly for the international aid community in Monrovia.

Ap - B. Approach and Methodology

1. Approach

The team performed this final assessment in three discrete phases during the period of May 24 – June 14, 1997.

- *Phase 1:* The team evaluated and performed statistical analyses on the only available data sources (UN-HACO). This contributed to identify the most appropriate field trips and key informants for the following phase considering the time limitations. Initial baseline data was established based in the analysis of demobilization registration databases.
- *Phase 2:* The team collected and analyzed opinions and viewpoints from a wide range of key informants in Monrovia and field visits. In this phase the team interviewed stakeholders to derive qualitative data to supplement the quantitative analysis
- *Phase 4:* The team reviewed relevant documents and devised recommendations for future USAID interventions, elaborated draft reports and de-briefed USAID and US Embassy staff in Monrovia.

We relied on a five-pronged approach to assess the contribution of the disarmament and demobilization activities to the overall security situation of Liberia.

- *This assessment is driven by data.* We were careful to base all of our assumptions and baseline on hard data. The validity of available information from the UN-HACO registration system was verified when possible through interviews and focus groups.
- *We focused on results.* We asked a series of questions about the various activities comprising the disarmament and demobilization efforts focusing in the changes or immediate results brought by these activities.
- *We compared ex-combatants and civilians.* Our scope of work asked us to assess the impact of the disarmament and demobilization activities and their contribution to security goals, and naturally, our research focused on the situation of the ex-fighters. However, we also examined the situation of civilians, representing, by definition, the standard for reintegration.
- *We assessed how other experiences can contribute to the pacification of Liberia.* We believe that results begin in the planning stage, when objectives are defined and benchmarks established for achieving these objectives. We therefore examined how lessons learned in other experiences can contribute to the Liberia case and help to make informed recommendations for future design, implementation and management of reintegration programming.
- *We stressed communication with the Mission throughout the assessment process.* Team members kept the Mission informally and formally apprised of the assessment's progress,

preliminary findings and stumbling blocks throughout the evaluation process. We valued these key stakeholders' knowledgeable input into our findings and interpretations of data, and we believe that ongoing communication with clients greatly facilitated the process of finalizing the assessment reports.

2. Methodology

The team was partially based in Monrovia and compiled information at the national level with visits to relevant agencies. During the second phase of activities, field visits were made to Montserrado, Grand Bassa, Margibi, Lofa, Bong, Bomi and Nimba Counties. Semi-structured interviews and focus groups were held at these locations with key stakeholders using specially developed guidelines (see next section).

The team was comprised of three researchers, one full time (three weeks) and two part time (two weeks). These individuals participated in the assessment with varying levels of effort according to the previously explained tasks and phases. The team was also supported by CAI/USAID in country advisor for the coordination of activities and some field visits.

Ap - C. Sources of data

The team collected generic and specific data from several sources. Most documents provided a narrative perspective of the events leading into the disarmament and demobilization activities but not consistent quantitative information. Although numerous sources were easily be identified throughout the country, significant inconsistencies were noted according to different sources. This is specially noticeable in relation to the total numbers for each of the demobilizing factions or the qualitative results of the D&D process.

This assessment established a series of findings throughout the report, driven by interviews with key stakeholders, different agencies' reports and relevant documents and interviews at the national level with all agencies involved in the pacification efforts.

- The team relied on **quantitative** data obtained directly from reporting mechanisms, databases and an array of documents from UN agencies, ECOMOG, USAID and other organizations.
- The team supplemented and expanded the quantitative data with **qualitative** information obtained through interviews at the national level and a specially developed guideline for individual and group meetings.

The most important information and data sources consulted for the assessment included:

- Databases created by UNDHA-HACO for the registration of demobilizing fighters. This source required the analysis of multiple databases and their recompilation for statistical purposes.
- Qualitative and in-depth interviews conducted in Monrovia and other locations with key agencies in the disarmament process.
- Demobilized soldiers, through direct and indirect interviews
- Interviews with donor representatives, Local officials, managers in charge program services at the national level, implementers' staff at provincial level.
- Reports from different agencies related to the disarmament and demobilization process

1. Guidelines for field interviews

a) Preliminary key informants

- ECOMOG field stations

- UNOMIL field stations
- UNDHA-HACO field officers
- Local NGOs and INGOs
- CRTs participants
- Local civilian authorities
- Others to be identified during field trips including ex-fighters if available.

Introduction: Purpose of the assessment.

The purpose of the assessment is to understand the immediate results of the disarmament and demobilization process and to project its impacts in future reintegration-programming activities. The team is analyzing what happened during the registration and disarmament phase and will devise recommendations for reintegration programs for demobilized personnel.

c) *Sample questions*

✓ *Demobilization/disarmament process*

- DS where required to turn in a weapon at registration time. What may be the incidence of combatants not registering because of not being able or willing to deliver a weapon?
- Children were not required to register with a weapon. Is it possible for a significant number of non-combatant children to have registered just for "incentives"?
- What were the types of incentives offered in this field station, if any?
- Do you think they were appropriate?
- Where the DS happy or willing to register? Was a feeling of forced registration present within the DS?
- Were there any inter-faction incidents observed at registration time among soldiers being demobilized?
- What about after disarmament?
- Who do you think the demobilization has benefited the most among the fighting factions?

✓ *Current situation*

- How would you describe the security conditions of the area after demobilization?
- Is there a perceivable improvement in security after disarmament?

- Have you heard of any rumors of arms caches in the region?
- Have you verify them?
- Are there CRTs operating in the area?
- How effective do you think they are?
- Are DS engaging in CRT's activities?
- Have there been any demands/problems from DS in the last 3 months?
- If any, what have been their requests/demands?

✓ *Stability of the peace process*

- Do you think the outcome of the elections would affect in the stability of the county/area?
- What would be the worst case scenario for the region in relation to the potential outcomes of the election process?
- How would you assess the capability for remobilization of the faction/s present in the region?
- How long would take them to remobilize?
- What could be igniting factors for remobilization?
- How this specific county/area can be stabilized from the peace perspective?
- What type of programs do you perceive as the most appropriate ones for this area?

2. Key qualitative informants

Catholic Relief Services (CRS) Buchanan

- ✓ Samuel Z. Boakai
- ✓ William K. Cordor
- ✓ Winston C. McGee
- ✓ Alberto B. Verdier
- ✓ Matthew W. Diggs
- ✓ Ofella Thwzuln
- ✓ Theresa M. Grighby
- ✓ Francis S. Nimely
- ✓ J. Malinson Nyematie

Don Bosco Peace Drop-In Center Buchanan

- ✓ Peter

<i>ECOMOG</i>	Buchanan	-	✓	Lt Col Dan Prah
<i>Joseph's Brethren</i>	Buchanan	-	✓	Chet Lowe
<i>UNOMIL</i>	Buchanan	-	✓	Lt. Col. Haq Hezhar
			✓	Maj. Haider Rizvi
			✓	Capt. Amr Josef
<i>Former AFL</i>	Camp Schiefflin	-	✓	Col. Flan
<i>Local authorities</i>	Ganta	-	✓	Rachel Evelyn Miller
			✓	Council members
<i>CRS</i>	Gbarnga	-	✓	Moses
			✓	David
<i>ECOMOG</i>	Gbarnga	-	✓	Maj. Lawal
<i>SCF</i>	Gbarnga	-	✓	Albert
<i>SDP/WAYS</i>	Gbarnga	-	✓	Moises Kwelula
<i>UN-HACO</i>	Gbarnga	-	✓	Raymond Nah
<i>UNOMIL</i>	Gbarnga	-	✓	Team leader
<i>ECOMOG</i>	Harbel	-	✓	Maj. Joseph
<i>ECOMOG</i>	Kakata	-	✓	Maj. Balogun
			✓	Maj. D. Ojabeh
<i>UNOMIL</i>	Kakata	-	✓	Maj. Ibrahim
			✓	Lt. Col. Mie
			✓	Capt. Atef Abdelraouf
<i>Justice and Peace Commission of the National Catholic Secretariat</i>	Monrovia	-	✓	Samuel K. Woods II

<i>ECOMOG</i>	Monrovia	- ✓	Deputy force Commander
<i>NDDC</i>	Monrovia	- ✓	K. Kamara
		✓	Edwin Kyne
<i>Save the Children UK</i>	Monrovia	- ✓	Una Mc Cauley
		✓	Sammy
<i>UN-DDSMS</i>	Monrovia	- ✓	Abdullahi Barre
<i>UN-HACO</i>	Monrovia	- ✓	Mike Gaouette
		✓	Shawn Messick
		✓	Robin Schoefield
<i>UNOMIL</i>	Monrovia	- ✓	Lt. Col. Malik Manzoor
<i>UNOPS</i>	Monrovia	- ✓	Daniel Seller
<i>USAID</i>	Monrovia	- ✓	Lowell Lynch
<i>ECOMOG</i>	Sawmil	- ✓	Capt. Robert Aowini
<i>ECOMOG</i>	Tubmanburg	- ✓	Maj. Omane Agyekum
<i>UN-HACO</i>	Tubmanburg	- ✓	Henry Lasu
		✓	J. Victor Nagbe
		✓	Matthew D. Baysah
<i>UNOMIL</i>	Tubmanburg	- ✓	Lt.Col. Anwaar Naqvi
<i>Local Authorities</i>	Weala	- ✓	Commissioner
		✓	Other representatives
<i>ECOMOG</i>	Zorzor	- ✓	Lt. Babayo
<i>Local Authorities</i>	Zorzor	- ✓	Commissioner
		✓	Town Chief

UNOMIL Zorzor

- ✓ Maj. Kamal
- ✓ Maj. Ben

Ap - D. Database analysis and representation of results

1. UNDHA-HACO registration database

As mentioned before, UNDHA-HACO managed the registration mechanism from the humanitarian perspective during the disarmament process. The team was provided by USAID with a sub-set of the data collected and this became the source for most of the quantitative information presented in this report.

All data was recompiled for statistical purposes and processed using three different electronic tools. The original copies of the clean datasets and the newly generated statistical sets were returned to the USAID after the conclusion of this assignment.

2. Other databases

The scope of work mention the possibility of comparing the humanitarian data from UNDHA-HACO with additional registration databases collected by ECOMOG and UNOMIL. At the time of the assessment, the ECOMOG data was not available to the team and UNOMIL information was not available in electronic format. The data entry effort required for processing UNOMIL registration information went beyond the scope of this activity.

3. Tables and other numeric data

Throughout the report and appendices with statistical data, many direct outputs from the tools utilized for the analyses are presented. The objective of this direct representation is to provide the reader with access to the raw results of the analyses rather than a summary conclusion. For this reason, some of the information provided may be presented in non-conventional formats. The following definitions attempt to facilitate the reading of raw statistical outputs.

<i>Case:</i>	each of the valid interviews held for the data gathering activity.
<i>Missing case:</i>	a case, in which at least one of the parameters under observation is not available, therefore cannot be counted as part of the valid cases.
<i>Frequency:</i>	indicates the number of cases having selected the category or option represented.
<i>Percent:</i>	percentile distribution of all available cases, including missing cases as a valid category.

<i>Valid percent:</i>	percentile distribution of all valid cases not including missing cases as a valid category. This is the measure utilized for reporting results.
<i>Cumulative percent:</i>	shows the addition of percentages counting the previously presented categories and the current one. This facilitates the reading of cumulative results for "better than..." or "worst than..." representations.
<i>Percentage of cases:</i>	when multiple responses were allowed for a single question, this represents the percentage of cases having selected this option in the overall distribution. All options add up to 100%.
<i>Percentage of responses:</i>	when multiple responses were allowed for a single question, this represents the incidence of the specific response in a potential 100% of cases. That is the same as asking how many of the respondents have selected this option. This percentage relates to the specific response and therefore for different options can add up to over 100%.
<i>Median:</i>	the line or value that separates the population in halves for any given parameter. In a normally distributed (symmetrical) population, the median is coincident with the mean (or arithmetic average for quantitative observations). This evaluation utilizes the median as the reference for evaluating opinions because it better represents the abnormal distribution found in these populations.
<i>Value and variable labels:</i>	each variable under examination has been given a rank value (or code) representing the respondents' answers. This numeric value is used for data processing and analyses. In order to facilitate the reading of information, each possible value has been assigned with a label that describes its meaning, and output information provides these values and labels. The variable label describes the question made to the respondent.

Ap - E. Definitions and glossary

1. Definition of terms

<i>Armed conflict</i>	A state of open, armed, often prolonged conflict carried on between nations, states, or parties. While a war can be carried on in different ways, the armed conflict refers to the military actions between fighting parties.
<i>Beneficiary</i>	The individual that has qualified for a service or benefit and had accessed it. Beneficiaries vary by benefit; they always are a sub-set of each targeted population.
<i>Benefits</i>	The set of programs, activities, and services designed and intended exclusively for a targeted group. Basic access to benefits is restricted to those individuals able to prove that they are part of the special target population. Usually estimations of the number of potential beneficiaries are made in the design phase to guarantee the availability of services. Examples of benefits include departure packages, cash payments, training services, and special "soft" credit lines or grants.
<i>Cease-fire</i>	The situation in which parties in conflict temporarily suspend armed conflict. This is always a requirement to discuss and implement demobilization activities. The cease-fire has to be guaranteed by all factions involved. An international monitoring presence has proven highly effective to help make the cease-fire permanent.
<i>Counseling</i>	An intervention designed to provide guidance and advice to ex-combatants in relation to issues surrounding the transition from military to civilian life. Often the most effective channel to provide objective and neutral information about access and requirements for programs and benefits, users benefit the most when the counseling process includes linkage to programs and opportunities. This provides for a one-stop neutral mechanism for ex-combatants to discuss their needs and to access benefits.
<i>Demobilization</i>	The process of discharge from military service related exclusively to the implementation of peace process activities. Demobilization takes place when combatants turn their weapons in for disposal, effectively reducing each faction operational capability and thereby stabilizing the cease-fire period.
<i>Demobilization ID or card</i>	Certification provided by appointed officials or international verification missions to eligible ex-combatants to guarantee access to programs and benefits targeted specifically to demobilized personnel

	and to facilitate benefits tracking and accountability.
<i>Demobilized</i>	Former combatant group who has been mustered-out from active military services through the implementation of peace agreements and complies with eligibility requirements for access to special treatment or benefits. Demobilized personnel are usually certified through specially issued demobilization identification.
<i>Disabled</i>	DS who have sustained lasting injuries which result in permanent handicaps as a result of the war
<i>Donor</i>	An organization or individual who contributes something, such as money, to a cause or fund; in this specific case, representative members of the international community assisting the war to peace transition through economic support, technical assistance and peace accords compliance monitoring.
<i>Eligibility Criteria</i>	<p>The set of rules previously agreed by all the involved stakeholders/policy-makers used to determine if a potential beneficiary qualifies for access to a benefit. The basic components of an ex-combatant eligibility criteria should include at least the following definitions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identification requirements. Defines the minimum documents or certifications required to be identified as part of the targeted population. • Access window or time frames. Determines for how long the opportunity or benefit will be available to interested populations. • Special groups definitions. This can help to define the access rights when a specific sub-set of the targeted population is intended to be served. Examples include gender, age, educational requirements, social situation, geographical origin/destination, and years of service.
<i>Ex-combatant</i>	Any participant in the armed conflict active as a fighting party after the demobilization process took place. This term is usually replaced with <i>demobilized</i> when specific eligibility criteria qualify a sub-set of the ex-combatant population for special treatment or benefits, and <i>veterans</i> for the rest of the ex-combatant population.
<i>Linkage</i>	Liaison between targeted populations, usually unaware of program requirements and access mechanisms, and services or benefits providers. This referral or liaison is most effective when provided through a counseling and referral service.
<i>Opportunities</i>	The set of offerings available only at a certain period, usually non-repeatable, driven basically by social and economic factors, and not

	intended to be group-specific. Due to the volatile characteristic of the opportunities, the access is generally ruled by a "first come, first served" approach. Examples of these cases can be found in job placement programs and NGO development activities
<i>Peace Accords</i>	The set of documents produced through peace negotiations defining the terms for the cease-fire and further activities to attain a sustainable peace.
<i>Practitioners</i>	Persons and institutions with an active role in the definition, management or implementation of reintegration programming.
<i>Reconstruction</i>	Programs or activities designed and intended to repair the effects of the armed conflict. These activities usually target damaged infrastructure and basic services with a focus on restoring war damaged social fabric.
<i>Reinsertion</i>	Incorporation of an individual or special group into the mainstream society after a traumatic experience. For the ex-combatants' case, the term is usually interchangeable with <i>reintegration</i> , but in strict terms, reinsertion should refer to a person's holistic return to civil society.
<i>Reintegration</i>	Social and economic rehabilitation of groups or individuals who have been demobilized.
<i>Stakeholder</i>	Any individual or group which has a stake or interest in a given issue. Stakeholders in matters of reintegration may include the demobilized soldiers themselves, their relatives, local communities, representative bodies, government, donors and aid agencies amongst others.
<i>Target Group</i>	The pool of potential beneficiaries for each reintegration activity. Each activity targets a specific group; the individuals who actually accessed the service are the beneficiaries.
<i>Veteran</i>	Ex-combatant who has retired from active service but who fails to meet the eligibility requirements to qualify as a DS (with access to benefits or special treatment). An example could be a combatant who was mustered out from military service before the end of armed conflict.
<i>Vulnerable Groups</i>	Special groups or specific social segments who are disadvantaged in relation to their communities as result of the armed conflict. These groups usually include war wounded or war disabled, orphans, child soldiers, displaced people and refugees.

2. Glossary of acronyms

AA	Assembly Area
AFL	Armed Forces of Liberia
BTC	Barclay Training Center
CAII	Creative Associates International, Inc.
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
CS	Child Soldier
D&D	Disarmament and Demobilization
DD&R	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DHA	Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)
DPKO	Department of Peace-Keeping operations (UN)
DRP	Demobilization and Reintegration Process
DS	Demobilized soldier(s)
ECOMOG	Economic Community Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
IA	Implementing Agency
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
JPO	Joint policy of operations
LDF	Lofa Defense Council
LNGO	Local NGO
LNTG	Liberia National Transitional Government
LPC	Liberia Peace Council
NDDC	National Disarmament and Demobilization Commission
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
OAU	Organization of African Unity
PAE	Pacific Architectural Engineers
SCF	Save the Children Fund
ULIMO-J	United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (Johnson)
ULIMO-K	United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (Kromah)
UN	United Nations
UNDHA-HACO	UN Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit (DHA)
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNICEF	
UNOMIL	United Nations Military Observer Mission in Liberia
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government

WFP World Food Program
WVI World Vision International
XC Ex-Combatant

Ap - F. Target area strategies in a county fund

1. Description of TAS

A Target Area Strategy (TAS) defines a cohesive “rolling” plan for the social and economic recovery of a micro-region comprised of a set of communities or villages recovering from armed conflict or economic stagnation. The plan provides a template for short term projects which are implemented over continuous 6 month periods to provide immediate benefits and relief to affected communities. These projects known as Community Revitalization Projects (CRPs) build on each other and collectively energize the revival of the micro-region over the course of a two to five year period. The outcomes of CRPs are measured through a built-in monitoring and evaluation component which feeds into future project design and updates the recovery plan.

The intended impact of a TAS is that it should contribute to a change in the social interaction of communities in a micro-region: movement of goods and people, productivity cycles, trading patterns, a shift to more effective, participatory civilian leadership and active involvement of a community in shaping its future.

2. TAS as a planning tool

The TAS is effective for planning and implementing projects in war-affected regions and vulnerable populations because it takes a long-term perspective but implements discrete interventions over the short term to produce immediate results. This accommodates environments that are unstable, emerging from states of emergency, with transitory populations, shifts in political power, or undergoing reform and restructuring of government. CRPs serves to anchor communities by providing immediate concrete economic benefits and opportunities for its members to rebuild together and to begin developing a vision for the future.

The TAS is based on principles and tools of development: strategic planning, needs assessments, community organization, integrated multisectoral rural development, training and technical assistance, and participatory monitoring and evaluation. CAII's TAS manual contains the following tools:

- Target area assessments.
- Criteria for selection of micro-regions
- Guidelines for interviewing the community
- Guidelines for presenting CREA and the project to the community
- Methodologies for formation of partner community organizations
- Feasibility analysis and project prioritization with community input

- Guidelines for community agreements
- Guidelines for writing a Target Area Strategy
- Guidelines for designing and writing CRPs
- Monitoring and evaluation plan with sample survey instrument, indicators, and data collection methods
- Guidelines for subgrant agreements with NGOs and service providers and model contract.

3. The goals of TAS and CRPs

The TAS contributes to the return to a civil society ("normalcy") by addressing the program areas of resettlement, reintegration and development needs through interventions that enable the target communities to re-establish themselves, and ultimately absorb returning populations. More specifically, the TAS accelerates the return of displaced populations, refugees and ex-combatants, undermines conflict and reduces dependency on hand-outs. The TAS works through civilian structures at the local level, enabling these structures and community members to prioritize their needs and develop responses appropriate to their lives.

Through sustained community involvement, the CAII strives to create a context in which an individual or community sees the future with hope, without fear for personal security and willing to proactively invest in solutions to meet their mid to long-term needs. The TAS defines resettlement, reintegration and developmental needs and measures improvements as follows:

- **Resettlement:** the return of internally displaced populations (including refugees, demobilized combatants and their families) to places where they plan on staying for the long-term. Improvements in community stability are represented by:
 - ◊ Improved perception of security,
 - ◊ Increasing reconciliation,
 - ◊ Perceived potential for better quality of life,
 - ◊ Improved community spirit.
- **Reintegration:** the process in which individuals or communities re-establish/rehabilitate social patterns and infrastructure and do not perceive the causes of warfare and/or violence as inhibitors to social interaction. Rehabilitation of community infrastructure is represented by:
 - ◊ Increased citizen participation
 - ◊ Local civilian government structures/leadership
 - ◊ Improved availability of basic services
 - ◊ Improved community accessibility.


- **Development needs:** the range of possible community and individual material needs that go beyond emergency or relief assistance, and address short- and mid-term economic needs. The revitalization of traditional economic patterns is represented by:
 - ◊ Increased self sufficiency
 - ◊ Restored market forces
 - ◊ Restored informal sector

4. Assumptions

The sum of activities in a given area is expected to improve economic and social conditions and opportunities. CRPs are viewed as vehicles for fostering community initiative, enabling civilian structures and supporting self-reliance. The primary assumption is that a less vulnerable (economically) community with a more robust social fabric is better able, both materially and socially, to absorb an influx of returning populations with less conflict, in particular demobilized soldiers, internally displaced persons and refugees. A secondary assumption is that stabilized populations are in a better position to contribute to the maintenance of peace through the return to civilian leadership, productivity and self-sufficiency.

5. The sequence of developing a TAS


The sequence of TAS development includes three phases, each with its own steps, tools, actions and outcomes. While the following flowchart details these components, it is important to note that the assessment and design phases imply interaction with a number of communities before a TAS is developed.



6. The project cycle

Each CRP contributes towards the overall objectives of TAS. There should be clearly defined linkages and complementarity between the CRPs and the TAS. Each must demonstrate levels of community participation and commitment.

The project cycle is shown below:



7. Criteria for selection of sites

A TAS is the result of a series of on-going regional and community assessments conducted in areas that show potential for development. The first step in developing a TAS is to conduct an area assessment, to get an idea of key communities in the micro-region and their programming potential. Area Assessments are conducted with municipal authorities, NGOs, peacekeeping/multinational forces (if applicable), governmental and private entities who work within a given micro-region.

After an a micro-region is identified and the communities preselected, the project manager will conduct a target area needs assessment, carry out a basic demographic survey and prepare an inventory of available skills and resources within the community. This will facilitate design of a realistic and effective implementation strategy and preparation of a work plan aimed at community economic revitalization through CRPs.

The area assessment for developing TAS should contain, but not be limited to, the following topics:

- **Cluster of CRP potential** – Explain how different interventions can interrelate generating a critical mass for the area revitalization.
- **Technical feasibility** – Detail why projects can and should be implemented in the area from a technical perspective.
- **Political constraints** – Explore the political acceptance of interventions in the area. Analyze the implications of specific CRPs from the political perspective.
- **Logistical, security and geographical constraints** – Analyze the logistical, security and geographical limitations for project implementation and plan for resource allocation considering these factors.

A prospective TAS should contain at least two target communities that demonstrate (through the initial assessments):

- Current stability of populations (i.e., that the communities belong to and have a history of land tenure in the area);
- Potential for returning demobilized with their families;
- Perceived numbers of displaced due to the war;
- Functional civilian and governing structures and organizations;
- Immediate needs that do not include emergency or relief interventions;
- Feasible productive sectors of past or present economic activity included agriculture, animal husbandry, forestry, handicrafts, service industries, fisheries. Road access, security, presence or history of NGOs in the areas and their interventions.

8. Guidelines for a TAS plan

a) *General background to the micro-region*

The project manager will provide a general background to the community with information collected in the area assessments:

b) *Productive patterns*

This section should include feasible productive sectors and/or patterns of past or present economic activity including agriculture, animal husbandry, forestry, handicrafts, service industries, fisheries.

c) *Disruptions that have occurred to productive patterns*

This section includes discussion of inhibitors to revitalizing productive patterns (i.e., lack of seeds, stock, raw materials, technology, disrepair of irrigation canals, roads and bridges, product processing and storage, marketing links, etc.)

d) *Social infrastructure*

This should discuss the existing and non-functioning schools (including the upper levels) and missions.

e) *Previous interventions in the area*

This should discuss the history of communities in projects with NGOs in the past, what has been done, distributed /accomplished, and when.

f) *Potential for CRPs and strategy for intervention*

This section should include a discussion of targeted communities, potential CRPs and their programmatic linkages, incremental approach to implementation over a 2 to 5 year period (i.e., a school rehabilitation to evolve relationship with the community then implementation of an irrigation canal rehabilitation that will lead to land preparation and an alternative crop seed distribution. Timeliness of interventions should be discussed in terms of when, where, and why.

g) *Feasibility of interventions*

The project manager should include data gathered using the SWOT model for determining the feasibility of the suggested CRPs.

9. CRP project development

a) *Common terminology*

The following terms are used in the CRP project format. A common definition for the terms is as follows:

- **Goals** are the overarching program aims, described in broad terms (i.e., "to revitalize traditional economic farm to market patterns")
- **Interventions** are the programmatic actions (CRPs) aimed to reach an intended goal.
- **Objectives** are the desired outcomes and impact of the intervention, and include what, where, when, how much and to whom and how many.
- **Subjects** of interventions are the persons, families, communities or even things directly affected by the intervention.
- **Outcomes** are the immediate results of the intervention, measured in terms of quantitative change for the subjects.
- **Impact** is the change enabled by the outcomes of the intervention, through the changes in the subjects and affecting the beneficiaries.
- **Direct beneficiaries** are the people affected by the impact of the intervention.

- *Indirect beneficiaries* are the individuals affected by the impact in the subject and direct beneficiaries.

It is important to distinguish between a project's impact — change — and outcomes or immediate results. The hypothetical case below illustrates this differentiation.

“The A village used to travel to B market for trading their cabbage production. They stopped producing cabbage because the market is no longer accessible fast enough for this type of product. We rehabilitated a bridge. Now the A community is producing cabbages and they are able to trade fresh products in the B market”

In this hypothetical example:

- The **subject** for an intervention is the bridge which needs to be rebuilt.
- The **intervention** is an infrastructure project to rebuild the bridge.
- The **outcome** is the community's ability to travel to the market quickly.
- The **impact** is the change in their production pattern, from no cabbages produced for sale to an income generating activity.
- The **direct beneficiaries** from this intervention are the cabbage producers in the A village, the users of the B market who now can buy fresh cabbage, etc.
- The **indirect beneficiaries** are the families of the cabbage producers which now can get other products in exchange for their cabbage, the community which has wealthier members, other producers who can use the bridge, and so on.

10. Monitoring and evaluation component

a) Purpose

The TAS incorporates a monitoring and evaluation system to measure the performance and impact of CRP activities in transitional settings. The monitoring and evaluation system should provide for:

- On-going assessment of project outcomes and effectiveness with planned adjustments in selection criteria for future interventions.
- Documentation of pre-conditions and factors affecting the communities before and during CRP implementation.
- Qualitative assessment of changes associated with the introduction of CRPs from the community perspective.
- Documentation of external factors which improve or impede the intended CRP results.
- Identification and documentation of unintended changes in CRP target communities.

- Generation of quantitative and qualitative data gathering and information management tools.
- Final reporting on project achievements related to objectives, constraints and unintended results.
- Final documentation of project experience, lessons learned and extrapolation of models that can be replicated in other transitional settings.

b) Assumptions and Common Terminology

Community revitalization projects are grounded in the assumption that “normalized” communities will facilitate the return, resettlement and reintegration of “traumatized” populations, in particular demobilized soldiers and internally displaced persons. A second layer of programmatic assumptions states that “stabilized” populations will be better able to contribute to the maintenance of peace through the return to civilian leadership, productive activities and self-sufficiency.

For program design and evaluation purposes, CREA assumes that:

Normalcy is the context in which an individual or community envisions the future with hope, without fear for personal security, and is willing to proactively invest in activities for mid- and long-term solutions to needs.

Resettlement is the return of internally displaced populations (including demobilized and their families) to places where they plan on staying for the long-term. The project objective of resettlement is to improve community stability. Improvements in community stability are represented by:

- Improved perception of security:
- Increasing reconciliation
- Perceived potential for better quality of life
- Improved community spirit

Reintegration is the process in which individuals or communities re-establish / rehabilitate social patterns and infrastructure and do not perceive the causes of warfare and/or violence as inhibitors to social interaction. The project objective of reintegration is to rehabilitate community social infrastructure. Rehabilitation of community infrastructure is represented by:

- Increased citizen participation
- Local government structures/leadership
- Improved availability of basic services
- Improved community accessibility

Development needs are the range of possible community and individual material needs that go beyond emergency or relief assistance, and address short- and mid-term economic needs.

The project objective for development needs is to revitalize traditional economic¹⁵ patterns. The revitalization of traditional economic patterns is represented by:

- Increased self sufficiency
- Restored market forces
- Restored informal sector

The sum of our activities in a given area is expected to improve economic and social conditions / opportunities. The assumption¹⁶ is that when communities are self-sufficient economically and more cohesive socially they are more apt toward tolerance and reconciliation. Social infrastructure projects are seen to be vehicles for fostering community initiative, enabling civilian structures and supporting self-reliance. A less vulnerable (economically) community with a more robust social fabric is better able, both materially and socially, to absorb an influx of returning populations with less conflict.

c) Performance monitoring indicators

Performance monitoring indicators are developed on a project by project basis to reflect the specific circumstances and objectives of each CRP. The following list of hypothetical projects illustrates indicators that can be used to show outcome, impact, change in capacity and performance:

PROJECT	OUTCOME	IMPACT	CAPACITY	PERFORMANCE
AGRICULTURE: Traditional	New planting area (x hectares).	Reestablishment of the agricultural production pattern.	Increase in local production (from x to y tons of product).	New products, activities available because of new production (from x to y/z new activities).
AGRICULTURE: Alternative	product planting area (x hectares of y alternative product.	Diversification of agricultural production.	Change in local production (from none to x tons of new product).	Activities available as a result of new production, new trading opportunities (from x to y/z new activities).
INFRASTRUCTURE Road Rehabilitation	Road rehabilitated (x kilometers).	Improved mobility of people and goods.	Change in communication links (from x communities in contact before road to y communities after).	New trade activities, reconciliation, and mutual support (from x to y/z).
INFRASTRUCTURE Bridge Rehabilitation	Bridge rehabilitated (x meters)	Improved mobility of people and goods.	Change in communication links (from x communities in contact before bridge to y communities after).	New trade activities, reconciliation, and mutual support (from x to y/z).
INFRASTRUCTURE School Rehabilitation	Infrastructure rehabilitated (square meters, roof improved, number of windows installed, number of doors).	Improved conditions for existing school classes	Change in the school hours delivered during the rainy season (from average x days of classes, if suspended, to continuous).	Improvement in community commitment through rehabilitation of social infrastructure better-educated children, uninterrupted class schedules.

¹⁵ Economic reactivation CRPs are considered to be those activities that generate income or surplus capital goods.

¹⁶ It is the evaluation component's task to test this assumption, as well as the effectiveness of CRPs in this process.

11. Planning for Impact

As mentioned before, impact is change. Change for more, change for better and/or change for different. The impact of an intervention starts at its design. Projects must be designed for impact, considering how their immediate results – outcomes – will generate changes in the subject and beneficiaries. These changes manifest themselves as a direct result of the intervention's outcomes, or as indirect result of applying these outcomes.

- When the intervention builds capacity to produce changes, it is considered *impact in capacity*.
- When the changes are produced by the application/use of the capacity, these are considered *impact in performance*.

This differentiation becomes very important for CRP types. The rehabilitation of a bridge can only provide for the capacity to increase communication and trade between two markets, while the actual trading after the bridge is built (*performance indication*) might depend on completely different circumstances and factors. In this case the *outcome* of the intervention is a new bridge, which could be measured in meters of bridge rehabilitated. Project performance indications relate to this outcome. The *impact in capacity* for the activity is the potential for increased trade between to markets. The *impact in performance* of the activity is related to factors not directly affected by the intervention itself, thereby making it very difficult to predict. This example shows an activity in which the designer plans for capacity, but cannot plan for performance through the outcome of the specific intervention.

When a different CRP plans for the introduction of training activities for bee-keeping promoters, the *intervention* or vehicle becomes the training itself. The *subjects* of this intervention are the bee-keeping promoters. The *outcome* of the activity can be measured in number of promoters graduated from the training course. The *impact in capacity* is the change from no capability to train bee-keepers to new promoters being able to provide this expertise to honey and wax producers. Once again, the *impact in performance* will only occur when the trainers actually provide this knowledge to the bee-keepers and therefore, they are able to change their production techniques.

The project designer must become familiar with these concepts. As mentioned above, any project's impact begins at the design phase and must be planned for. The distinction between the project impact in capacity and performance separate the variables, constraints and external factors over which the designer can exert certain control from the uncontrollable ones, which in turn, could render the intervention less valuable than expected. During the project design phase, these questions can help to identify the different elements in a potential activity

Example of designing for impact: Bridge rehabilitation between Tchicaca & Bailundo

What are we trying to change?

⇒ *Defines the activity objectives from impact perspective*

A trading pattern.

Are we changing it for quantity?

⇒ *Defines if we plan for more, increased goals*

There is some trading now, but we want to increase it.

Are we changing it for quality?

⇒ *Defines if we plan for better, qualitative goals*

No.

Are we introducing something new?

⇒ *Defines if we plan for different, alternative goals*

No.

What is/are the inhibitor/s for changes to happen?

⇒ *Defines who/what is the subject of the intervention*

Traders cannot reach the Bailundo market with large surpluses because they have to carry their goods on their back or by *trotineta* (and therefore surplus production potential is not met).

What is the vehicle for this/these inhibitors to be addressed?

⇒ *Defines the intervention*

The rehabilitation of the bridge (materials, technical expertise, labor).

What is the immediate result of applying this vehicle/intervention?. How do I measure it?

⇒ *Defines the outcome of the intervention and indicators*

A bridge rehabilitated measured in meters of bridge.

Is this immediate result affecting the subject?. How do I measure it?

⇒ *Establishes impact for capacity indications*

A rehabilitated bridge enables people to increase their farm to market trade. Our assessment indicates that the Bailundo traders claim that the Tchicaca area pre-1992 (when the bridge was blown) supplied a third of their produce, some three truckloads a day. The Tchicaca community, who brought this project to our attention, believes that the bridge being rehabilitated would increase their production by 50%.

Is the subject performance affecting the inhibitor? How do I measure it?

⇒ *Establishes impact for performance indications*

If the bridge is being used more after rehabilitation, what is the increase in traffic?

What is the increase in Tchicaca production?

Who are the indirect beneficiaries of the intervention?

⇒ *Defines where to measure the performance indicators.*

Tchicaca farmers and Bailundo traders.

The following table summarizes different types of impact planned during the project design.


	Impact in capacity	Impact in performance
Planned for more	<p>Intervention provides the subject with the capacity to achieve more results. For example:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Training interventions incorporate capacity for new production techniques to increase productivity.</i> • <i>School roof rehabilitation provides for capacity to increase class hours during rainy season.</i> 	<p>The beneficiary performs more as a direct result of the intervention. For example:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Provision of oxen makes selected farmers increase production from self-consumption levels to surplus quantities for trade.</i> • <i>More health promoters in certain community make more children receive vaccines.</i>
Planned for better	<p>Intervention provides the subject with the capacity to achieve better results. For example:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Training promoters in bee-keeping technology gives them the capacity to improve honey production.</i> • <i>Rehabilitation of wells provides the capacity to improve water quality.</i> 	<p>The beneficiary performs better as a direct result of the intervention. For example:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Bee-keepers trained by promoters to retrieve honey without killing bees improves sustainability and growth of the activity.</i> • <i>Rehabilitation of irrigation channels allows farmers to improve their family diet with vegetables.</i>
Planned for different	<p>Intervention provides the subject with the capacity to achieve different results. For example:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Microenterprise creation activities provide the capacity for new income generating patterns.</i> • <i>The rehabilitation of a bridge provides the capacity for access to a different market with new products.</i> 	<p>The beneficiary performs differently as a direct result of the intervention. For example:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Alternative types of seeds provided to farmers, changes the nutrition value of the community.</i> • <i>Demining of a closed area allows the community to establish relationships and trade with neighboring villages.</i>

Ap - G. Raw statistical analysis of UNDHA-HACO database

DEMOBILIZATION BY SITE

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
BTC (Randall St.)	3	3466	17.0	17.0	17.0
Voinjama	17	3035	14.9	14.9	31.9
Kakata	11	2888	14.1	14.1	46.0
Gbarnga	8	2471	12.1	12.1	58.1
Camp Naama	5	2317	11.4	11.4	69.5
Sawmill	14	1190	5.8	5.8	75.3
Tappita	15	759	3.7	3.7	79.0
Sanniquellie	13	691	3.4	3.4	82.4
Buchanan	4	638	3.1	3.1	85.5
Camp Schiefflin	6	623	3.1	3.1	88.6
Zwedru	18	605	3.0	3.0	91.5
Bo Waterside	2	490	2.4	2.4	93.9
Tubmanburg	16	404	2.0	2.0	95.9
Greenville	9	357	1.7	1.7	97.7
Harper	10	284	1.4	1.4	99.1
Fassama	7	121	.6	.6	99.6
Barclayville	1	56	.3	.3	99.9
Kanweaken	12	16	.1	.1	100.0
Total		20411	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 20411 Missing cases 0



DEM_WEEK Demobilization weekly

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
11/22/96	1	1899	9.3	9.3	9.3
11/29/96	2	1613	7.9	7.9	17.2
12/06/96	3	1068	5.2	5.2	22.5
12/13/96	4	896	4.4	4.4	26.9
12/20/96	5	313	1.5	1.5	28.4
12/27/96	6	441	2.2	2.2	30.6
01/03/97	7	588	2.9	2.9	33.4
01/10/97	8	1196	5.9	5.9	39.3
01/17/97	9	2573	12.6	12.6	51.9
01/24/97	10	5707	28.0	28.0	79.9
01/31/97	11	3370	16.5	16.5	96.4
02/07/97	12	726	3.6	3.6	100.0
.	.	21	.1	Missing	
Total		20411	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 20390 Missing cases 21

FACTION Factions distribution

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NPFL	3	11870	58.2	58.5	58.5
ULIMO-K	1	5042	24.7	24.8	83.3
LPC	4	1331	6.5	6.6	89.8
ULIMO-J	2	1143	5.6	5.6	95.5
AFL	9	617	3.0	3.0	98.5
LDF	5	240	1.2	1.2	99.7
ARM. CIV.	8	50	.2	.2	99.9
INPFL	6	9	.0	.0	100.0
CRC	7	5	.0	.0	100.0
.	.	104	.5	Missing	
Total		20411	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 20307 Missing cases 104

Age range

Number of valid observations (listwise) = 20350.00

Variable	Mean	Range	Minimum	Maximum	Valid N	Label
AGE	24.20	70.00	8	78	20350	Reported age

ORIG	County of origin					
Value	Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	Lofa	7	5979	29.3	29.3	29.3
	Bong	2	3269	16.0	16.0	45.3
	Nimba	11	2194	10.7	10.8	56.1
	Grand Bassa	4	1960	9.6	9.6	65.7
	Sinoe	13	1398	6.8	6.9	72.6
	Maryland	9	966	4.7	4.7	77.3
	Cape Mount	3	949	4.6	4.7	82.0
	Bomi	1	787	3.9	3.9	85.8
	Grand Gedeh	5	735	3.6	3.6	89.4
	Margibi	8	707	3.5	3.5	92.9
	Grand Kru	6	469	2.3	2.3	95.2
	Montserrado	10	462	2.3	2.3	97.5
	Rivercess	12	302	1.5	1.5	98.9
	Abroad	14	217	1.1	1.1	100.0
	.		17	.1	Missing	
	Total		20411	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 20394 Missing cases 17

DESTIN	Destination County					
Value	Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	Montserrado	10	7085	34.7	36.9	36.9
	Lofa	7	3097	15.2	16.2	53.1
	Bong	2	2953	14.5	15.4	68.5
	Margibi	8	1563	7.7	8.2	76.6
	Nimba	11	1180	5.8	6.2	82.8
	Grand Bassa	4	1160	5.7	6.0	88.9
	Bomi	1	482	2.4	2.5	91.4
	Sinoe	13	436	2.1	2.3	93.6
	Cape Mount	3	349	1.7	1.8	95.5
	Grand Gedeh	5	276	1.4	1.4	96.9
	Maryland	9	246	1.2	1.3	98.2
	Rivercess	12	181	.9	.9	99.1
	Abroad	14	95	.5	.5	99.6
	Grand Kru	6	73	.4	.4	100.0
	.		1235	6.1	Missing	
	Total		20411	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 19176 Missing cases 1235

SEX Gender

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Male	1	20115	98.5	98.7	98.7
Female	2	256	1.3	1.3	100.0
	.	40	.2	Missing	
Total		20411	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 20371 Missing cases 40

SCHOOL School attendance

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
No	0	3161	15.5	15.7	15.7
Yes	1	17036	83.5	84.3	100.0
	.	214	1.0	Missing	
Total		20411	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 20197 Missing cases 214

RELIG Reported religion

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Other	1	405	2.0	2.0	2.0
Muslim	2	4044	19.8	20.1	22.1
Christ.	3	15712	77.0	77.9	100.0
	.	250	1.2	Missing	
Total		20411	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 20161 Missing cases 250

RANK Declared rank

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Private	1	2293	11.2	11.2	11.2
Corporal	2	107	.5	.5	11.8
Sergeant	3	1038	5.1	5.1	16.8
Master sergeant	4	306	1.5	1.5	18.3
Warrant officer	5	139	.7	.7	19.0
2nd Lieutenant	6	271	1.3	1.3	20.4
1nd Lieutenant	7	974	4.8	4.8	25.1
Lieutenant	8	1770	8.7	8.7	33.8
Captain	9	5038	24.7	24.7	58.5
Major	10	4056	19.9	19.9	78.3

Lt. Colonel	11	1528	7.5	7.5	85.8
Colonel	12	2413	11.8	11.8	97.7
Brigadier General	13	213	1.0	1.0	98.7
General	14	158	.8	.8	99.5
Others	15	107	.5	.5	100.0

Total	20411	100.0	100.0
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Valid cases 20411 Missing cases 0

EDUC Educational level

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
None	1	4020	19.7	19.7	19.7
Elementary	2	8130	39.8	39.8	59.5
Junior High	3	4622	22.6	22.6	82.2
Senior High	4	3136	15.4	15.4	97.5
Technical	5	251	1.2	1.2	98.8
College	6	252	1.2	1.2	100.0
Total		20411	100.0	100.0	

FATHER Father situation

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Don't Know	1	1217	6.0	6.0	6.0
Deceased	2	7505	36.8	36.9	42.9
Alive	3	11616	56.9	57.1	100.0
.	.	73	.4	Missing	
Total		20411	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 20338 Missing cases 73

MOTHER Mother situation

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Don't Know	1	1304	6.4	6.4	6.4
Deceased	2	4333	21.2	21.4	27.8
Alive	3	14658	71.8	72.2	100.0
.	.	116	.6	Missing	
Total		20411	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 20295 Missing cases 116

RANK Declared rank by FACTION Factions

RANK	Count Row Pct Col Pct	FACTION									Row Total
		ULIMO-K	ULIMO-J	NPFL	LPC	LDF	INPFL	CRC	ARM. CIV	AFL	
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
Private	1	772	314	727	161	30	3			281	2288
		33.7	13.7	31.8	7.0	1.3	.1			12.3	11.3
		15.3	27.5	6.1	12.1	12.5	33.3			45.5	
Corporal	2	35	15	26	11	1				19	107
		32.7	14.0	24.3	10.3	.9				17.8	.5
		.7	1.3	.2	.8	.4				3.1	
Sergeant	3	448	99	214	54	16	2			203	1036
		43.2	9.6	20.7	5.2	1.5	.2			19.6	5.1
		8.9	8.7	1.8	4.1	6.7	22.2			32.9	
Master sergeant	4	180	7	66	9	3	1			39	305
		59.0	2.3	21.6	3.0	1.0	.3			12.8	1.5
		3.6	.6	.6	.7	1.3	11.1			6.3	
Warrant officer	5	73	11	37	4					14	139
		52.5	7.9	26.6	2.9					10.1	.7
		1.4	1.0	.3	.3					2.3	
2nd Lieutenant	6	142	2	107	5	4				10	270
		52.6	.7	39.6	1.9	1.5				3.7	1.3
		2.8	.2	.9	.4	1.7				1.6	
1nd Lieutenant	7	457	11	327	23	14		3	50	13	898
		50.9	1.2	36.4	2.6	1.6		.3	5.6	1.4	4.4
		9.1	1.0	2.8	1.7	5.8		60.0	100.0	2.1	
Column		5042	1143	11870	1331	240	9	5	50	617	20307
Total		24.8	5.6	58.5	6.6	1.2	.0	.0	.2	3.0	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 104

RANK	Count Row Pct Col Pct	ULIMO-K	ULIMO-J	NPFL	LPC	LDF	INPFL	CRC	ARM.	CIV	AFL	Row Total
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9		
Lieutenant	8	748	119	733	139	16					11	1766
		42.4	6.7	41.5	7.9	.9					.6	8.7
		14.8	10.4	6.2	10.4	6.7					1.8	
Captain	9	1236	250	3139	339	62	1	1			9	5037
		24.5	5.0	62.3	6.7	1.2	.0	.0			.2	24.8
		24.5	21.9	26.4	25.5	25.8	11.1	20.0			1.5	
Major	10	618	143	2963	286	40					1	4051
		15.3	3.5	73.1	7.1	1.0					.0	19.9
		12.3	12.5	25.0	21.5	16.7					.2	
Lt. Colonel	11	170	46	1228	67	12	1	1			3	1528
		11.1	3.0	80.4	4.4	.8	.1	.1			.2	7.5
		3.4	4.0	10.3	5.0	5.0	11.1	20.0			.5	
Colonel	12	131	89	1958	192	30					6	2406
		5.4	3.7	81.4	8.0	1.2					.2	11.8
		2.6	7.8	16.5	14.4	12.5					1.0	
Brigadier General	13	7	1	189	12	3					1	213
		3.3	.5	88.7	5.6	1.4					.5	1.0
		.1	.1	1.6	.9	1.3					.2	
General	14	14	14	102	21	5					1	157
		8.9	8.9	65.0	13.4	3.2					.6	.8
		.3	1.2	.9	1.6	2.1					.2	
Others	15	11	22	54	8	4	1				6	106
		10.4	20.8	50.9	7.5	3.8	.9				5.7	.5
		.2	1.9	.5	.6	1.7	11.1				1.0	
Column Total		5042	1143	11870	1331	240	9	5	50	617	20307	
Total		24.8	5.6	58.5	6.6	1.2	.0	.0	.2	3.0	100.0	
Number of Missing Observations: 104												

PREV_ACT Previous occupation

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Attended School	3	12796	62.7	63.8	63.8
Petty Trade/Market	15	2449	12.0	12.2	76.0
Farming	8	1846	9.0	9.2	85.2
Employed	7	1796	8.8	9.0	94.2
Army	2	354	1.7	1.8	95.9
Mechanic	11	165	.8	.8	96.8
Driver	6	158	.8	.8	97.5
Apprentice	1	109	.5	.5	98.1
Unemployed	19	109	.5	.5	98.6
Other	14	72	.4	.4	99.0
Carpenter	5	46	.2	.2	99.2
Nothing	13	44	.2	.2	99.4
Tailor	17	31	.2	.2	99.6
Mining	12	27	.1	.1	99.7
Self employed	16	18	.1	.1	99.8
Teacher	18	13	.1	.1	99.9
Business	4	10	.0	.0	99.9
Fishing	9	7	.0	.0	100.0
Mason	10	7	.0	.0	100.0
.		354	1.7	Missing	
Total		20411	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	20057	Missing cases	354		

FATHER Father situation by MOTHER Mother situation

		MOTHER				
		Count				
		Row Pct	Don't Kn	Deceased	Alive	
		Col Pct	ow			
FATHER	Tot Pct	1	2	3	Row Total	
Don't Know	1	937	70	206	1213	
		77.2	5.8	17.0	6.0	
		71.9	1.6	1.4		
		4.6	.3	1.0		
Deceased	2	229	2632	4623	7484	
		3.1	35.2	61.8	36.9	
		17.6	60.8	31.6		
		1.1	13.0	22.8		
Alive	3	138	1625	9817	11580	
		1.2	14.0	84.8	57.1	
		10.6	37.6	67.0		
		.7	8.0	48.4		
Column Total		1304	4327	14646	20277	
		6.4	21.3	72.2	100.0	

Number of Missing Observations: 134

EXPECT Expected occupation

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Attend School	1	10509	51.5	51.9	51.9
Learn a Trade	7	5298	26.0	26.1	78.0
Farming	6	1200	5.9	5.9	83.9
Business	2	1061	5.2	5.2	89.2
Civil Work	3	1050	5.1	5.2	94.4
Military	8	432	2.1	2.1	96.5
Petty Trade	9	320	1.6	1.6	98.1
Others	11	174	.9	.9	98.9
Employment	5	131	.6	.6	99.6
Vocational	10	75	.4	.4	99.9
Don't know	4	11	.1	.1	100.0
	.	150	.7	Missing	
Total		20411	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 20261 Missing cases 150

EXPECT Expected occupation by EDUC Educational level

		EDUC							
Count									
Row	Pct	None	Elementa	Junior H	Senior H	Technica	College		Row
Col	Pct		ry	igh	igh	l			Total
EXPECT		1	2	3	4	5	6		
Attend School	1	924	5182	2576	1611	78	138		10509
		8.8	49.3	24.5	15.3	.7	1.3		51.9
		23.5	64.0	55.9	51.7	31.2	55.0		
Business	2	367	304	214	133	17	26		1061
		34.6	28.7	20.2	12.5	1.6	2.5		5.2
		9.3	3.8	4.6	4.3	6.8	10.4		
Civil Work	3	386	198	193	218	35	20		1050
		36.8	18.9	18.4	20.8	3.3	1.9		5.2
		9.8	2.4	4.2	7.0	14.0	8.0		
Don't know	4	8	3						11
		72.7	27.3						.1
		.2	.0						
Employment	5	47	32	23	23	5	1		131
		35.9	24.4	17.6	17.6	3.8	.8		.6
		1.2	.4	.5	.7	2.0	.4		
Farming	6	653	239	127	144	18	19		1200
		54.4	19.9	10.6	12.0	1.5	1.6		5.9
		16.6	3.0	2.8	4.6	7.2	7.6		
Column Total		3940	8093	4609	3118	250	251		20261
		19.4	39.9	22.7	15.4	1.2	1.2		100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 150

EXPECT	Count Row Pct Col Pct	EDUC						Row Total
		None	Elementa	Junior H	Senior H	Technica	College	
		1	2	3	4	5	6	
Learn a Trade	7	1279	1897	1260	778	72	12	5298
		24.1	35.8	23.8	14.7	1.4	.2	26.1
		32.5	23.4	27.3	25.0	28.8	4.8	
Military	8	86	69	103	133	13	28	432
		19.9	16.0	23.8	30.8	3.0	6.5	2.1
		2.2	.9	2.2	4.3	5.2	11.2	
Petty Trade	9	114	110	66	26	2	2	320
		35.6	34.4	20.6	8.1	.6	.6	1.6
		2.9	1.4	1.4	.8	.8	.8	
Vocational	10	29	12	11	22	1		75
		38.7	16.0	14.7	29.3	1.3		.4
		.7	.1	.2	.7	.4		
Others	11	47	47	36	30	9	5	174
		27.0	27.0	20.7	17.2	5.2	2.9	.9
		1.2	.6	.8	1.0	3.6	2.0	
Column		3940	8093	4609	3118	250	251	20261
Total		19.4	39.9	22.7	15.4	1.2	1.2	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 150

		DESTIN											Page 2 of 6	
		Count												
		Exp Val												
		Row Pct	Bomi	Bong	Cape Mou	Grand Ba	Grand Ge	Grand Kr	Lofa	Margibi	Maryland	Montserr	Nimba	Row
		Col Pct			nt	ssa	deh	u				ado		Total
ORIG		Tot Pct	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	
Lofa	7	77	510	30	60	7	4	2834	340	0	1733	34	5655	
		142.2	871.0	103.0	342.3	81.4	21.5	913.8	460.6	72.3	2089.3	348.2	29.5%	
		1.4%	9.0%	.5%	1.1%	.1%	.1%	50.1%	6.0%	.0%	30.6%	.6%		
		16.0%	17.3%	8.6%	5.2%	2.5%	5.5%	91.5%	21.8%	.0%	24.5%	2.9%		
		.4%	2.7%	.2%	.3%	.0%	.0%	14.8%	1.8%	.0%	9.0%	.2%		
Margibi	8	4	101	2	6	2	0	11	387	0	137	10	664	
		16.7	102.3	12.1	40.2	9.6	2.5	107.3	54.1	8.5	245.3	40.9	3.5%	
		.6%	15.2%	.3%	1.2%	.3%	.0%	1.7%	58.3%	.0%	20.6%	1.5%		
		.8%	3.4%	.6%	.7%	.7%	.0%	.4%	24.8%	.0%	1.9%	.8%		
		.0%	.5%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.1%	2.0%	.0%	.7%	.1%		
Maryland	9	9	42	6	25	6	0	10	28	214	569	15	933	
		23.5	143.7	17.0	56.5	13.4	3.6	150.8	76.0	11.9	344.7	57.4	4.9%	
		1.0%	4.5%	.6%	2.7%	.6%	.0%	1.1%	3.0%	22.9%	61.0%	1.6%		
		1.9%	1.4%	1.7%	2.2%	2.2%	.0%	.3%	1.8%	87.3%	8.0%	1.3%		
		.0%	.2%	.0%	.1%	.0%	.0%	.1%	.1%	1.1%	3.0%	.1%		
Montserratado	10	1	40	3	9	0	0	12	38	2	328	3	438	
		11.0	67.5	8.0	26.5	6.3	1.7	70.8	35.7	5.6	161.6	27.0	2.3%	
		.2%	9.1%	.7%	2.1%	.0%	.0%	2.7%	8.7%	.5%	74.9%	.7%		
		.2%	1.4%	.9%	.9%	.0%	.0%	.4%	2.4%	.8%	4.6%	.3%		
		.0%	.2%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.1%	.2%	.0%	1.7%	.0%		
Nimba	11	2	205	4	52	2	0	26	118	6	523	1015	1962	
		49.3	302.2	35.7	118.7	28.3	7.5	317.0	159.8	25.1	724.9	120.8	10.2%	
		.1%	10.4%	.2%	2.7%	.1%	.0%	1.3%	6.0%	.3%	26.7%	51.7%		
		.4%	6.9%	1.1%	4.5%	.7%	.0%	.8%	7.6%	2.4%	7.4%	86.0%		
		.0%	1.1%	.0%	.3%	.0%	.0%	.1%	.6%	.0%	2.7%	5.3%		
Rivercess	12	0	2	2	50	1	0	0	6	0	88	6	242	
		7.3	45.0	5.3	17.7	4.2	1.1	47.2	23.8	3.7	107.9	18.0	1.5%	
		.0%	.7%	.7%	17.1%	.3%	.0%	.0%	2.1%	.0%	30.1%	2.1%		
		.0%	.1%	.6%	4.3%	.4%	.0%	.0%	.4%	.0%	1.2%	.5%		
		.0%	.0%	.0%	.3%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.5%	.0%		
Column		482	2952	349	1160	276	73	3097	1561	245	7081	1180	19166	
(Continued) Total		2.5%	15.4%	1.9%	6.1%	1.4%	.4%	16.2%	8.1%	1.3%	36.9%	6.2%	100.0%	

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ORIG	DESTIN												Row Total	
	Count													
	Exp Val													
	Row Pct	Bomi	Bong	Cape Mou	Grand Ba	Grand Ge	Grand Kr	Lofa	Margibi	Maryland	Moniserr	Nimba		
	Col Pct	nt	ssa	deh	u					ado				
Tot Pct	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11			
Since	13	6	35	4	12	89	0	4	26	2	708	8	1303	
		32.8	200.7	23.7	78.9	18.8	5.0	210.5	106.1	16.7	481.4	80.2	6.8%	
		.5%	2.5%	.3%	.9%	6.8%	.0%	.3%	2.0%	.2%	54.3%	.6%		
		1.2%	1.1%	1.1%	1.0%	32.2%	.0%	.1%	1.7%	.8%	10.0%	.7%		
		.0%	.2%	.0%	.1%	.5%	.0%	.0%	.1%	.0%	3.7%	.0%		
Abroad	14	4	11	29	4	0	0	36	3	0	62	0	206	
		5.2	31.7	3.8	12.5	3.0	.8	33.3	16.8	2.6	76.1	12.7	1.1%	
		1.9%	5.3%	14.1%	1.9%	.0%	.0%	17.5%	1.5%	.0%	30.1%	.0%		
		.9%	.4%	8.3%	.3%	.0%	.0%	1.2%	.2%	.0%	.9%	.0%		
		.0%	.1%	.2%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.2%	.0%	.0%	.3%	.0%		
(Continued)	Column Total	482	2952	349	1160	276	75	3097	1561	245	7081	1180	19166	
		2.5%	15.4%	1.8%	6.1%	1.4%	.4%	16.2%	8.1%	1.3%	36.9%	6.2%	100.0%	

ORIG County of origin by DESTIN Destination County

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ORIG	DESTIN				Row Total
	Count				
	Exp Val				
	Row Pct	Riverces	Sinoe	Abroad	
	Col Pct				
	Tot Pct	12	13	14	
<hr/>					
Bomi	1	0	0	1	758
		7.1	17.2	3.7	4.0%
		.0%	.0%	.1%	
		.0%	.0%	1.1%	
		.0%	.0%	.0%	
<hr/>					
Bong	2	2	1	5	3054
		28.7	69.5	15.0	15.9%
		.1%	.0%	.2%	
		1.1%	.2%	5.3%	
		.0%	.0%	.0%	
<hr/>					
Cape Mount	3	1	0	5	867
		8.1	19.7	4.3	4.5%
		.1%	.0%	.6%	
		.6%	.0%	5.3%	
		.0%	.0%	.0%	
<hr/>					
Grand Bassa	4	19	4	3	1874
		17.6	42.6	9.2	9.8%
		1.0%	.2%	.2%	
		10.6%	.9%	3.2%	
		.1%	.0%	.0%	
<hr/>					
Grand Geden	5	0	4	4	711
		6.7	16.2	3.5	3.7%
		.0%	.6%	.6%	
		.0%	.9%	4.3%	
		.0%	.0%	.0%	
<hr/>					
Grand Kru	6	2	5	1	449
		4.2	10.2	2.2	2.3%
		.4%	1.1%	.2%	
		1.1%	1.1%	1.1%	
		.0%	.0%	.0%	
<hr/>					
Column		180	436	94	19166
Total		.9%	2.3%	.5%	100.0%

Number of Missing Observations: 1145

ORIG County of Origin by DESTIN Destination County

Page 5 of 6

ORIG	DESTIN				Row Total
	Count	Riverces Since		Abroad	
	Exp Val	s			
	Row Pct				
	Col Pct				
	Tot Pct	12	13	14	
Lofa	7	5	8	13	5655
		53.1	128.6	27.7	29.5%
		.1%	.1%	.2%	
		1.8%	1.8%	13.8%	
		.0%	.0%	.1%	
Margibi	8	1	0	1	664
		6.2	15.1	3.3	3.5%
		.2%	.0%	.2%	
		.6%	.0%	1.1%	
		.0%	.0%	.0%	
Maryland	9	4	5	0	933
		8.8	21.2	4.6	4.9%
		.4%	.5%	.0%	
		1.2%	1.1%	.0%	
		.0%	.0%	.0%	
Montserrat	10	1	1	0	438
		4.1	10.0	2.1	2.3%
		.2%	.2%	.0%	
		.6%	.2%	.0%	
		.0%	.0%	.0%	
Nimba	11	3	5	3	1962
		18.4	44.6	9.6	10.2%
		.2%	.2%	.2%	
		1.7%	.7%	3.2%	
		.0%	.0%	.0%	
Rivercess	12	136	1	0	290
		2.7	6.6	1.4	1.5%
		46.6%	.3%	.0%	
		75.6%	.2%	.0%	
		.7%	.0%	.0%	
Column		180	436	94	19166
Total		.9%	2.3%	.5%	100.0%

Number of Missing Observations: 1245

ORIG County of origin by DESTIN Destination County

Page 6 of 6

		DESTIN			
		Count			
		Exp Val			
		Row Pct	Riverces	Sinoe	Abroad
		Col Pct			
		Tot Pct	12	13	14
					Total
ORIG		13	6	404	1
					1303
	Sinoe		12.2	29.6	6.4
			.5%	31.0%	.1%
			3.3%	92.7%	1.1%
Abroad			.0%	2.1%	.0%
		14	0	0	57
					206
			1.9	4.7	1.0
			.0%	.0%	27.7%
Column			.0%	.0%	60.6%
			.0%	.0%	.3%
	Total		180	436	94
			.9%	2.3%	.5%
					19166
					100.0%

Number of Missing Observations: 1245

Demobilization Summary Sheet

Page 1

DDR site	Faction	# DS	% Chld	Mean age	% Male	% Muslim	% Christ.	% Father alive	% Mother alive	% Schooling
Barclayville	NPFL	56	1.8%	29	100.0%	.0%	92.9%	44.6%	61.8%	96.4%
Subtotal site		56	1.8%	29	100.0%	.0%	92.9%	44.6%	61.8%	96.4%
Bo Waterside	ULIMO-K	490	15.5%	25	99.0%	73.7%	25.7%	55.2%	70.8%	75.5%
Subtotal site		490	15.5%	25	99.0%	73.7%	25.7%	55.2%	70.8%	75.5%
BTC (Randall St.)	.	66	65.2%	17	100.0%	9.4%	90.6%	71.2%	81.3%	88.9%
	ULIMO-K	220	20.1%	22	100.0%	40.6%	59.4%	56.9%	77.2%	91.8%
	ULIMO-J	840	38.7%	21	99.4%	8.9%	91.1%	56.5%	75.7%	94.2%
	NPFL	1405	25.8%	22	99.9%	7.3%	92.3%	56.4%	73.2%	94.2%
	LPC	705	22.6%	24	99.9%	3.6%	96.4%	56.0%	69.9%	95.8%
	LDF	133	22.7%	25	99.2%	6.1%	93.9%	51.1%	70.7%	93.2%
	INPFL	6	16.7%	36	100.0%	16.7%	83.3%	33.3%	83.3%	83.3%
	CRC	3	33.3%	21	100.0%	50.0%	50.0%	66.7%	33.3%	66.7%
	ARM. CIV.	43	100.0%	14	100.0%	7.5%	92.5%	81.4%	83.4%	97.7%
	AFL	45	2.2%	32	100.0%	4.4%	95.6%	48.9%	64.4%	97.8%
Subtotal site		3466	29.1%	22	99.8%	9.1%	90.8%	56.8%	73.5%	94.3%
Buchanan	.	2	.0%	22	100.0%	.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	NPFL	633	18.6%	23	99.8%	3.4%	94.9%	56.9%	76.6%	82.8%
	LPC	1	.0%	25	100.0%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%
	INPFL	1	100.0%	13	100.0%	.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	ARM. CIV.	1	100.0%	11	100.0%	.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Subtotal site		638	18.7%	23	99.8%	3.3%	94.9%	57.1%	76.6%	82.9%
Camp Naama	NPFL	2316	22.2%	24	99.3%	7.8%	91.0%	52.2%	65.2%	86.3%
	CRC	1	.0%	18	100.0%	.	.	100.0%	.	100.0%
Subtotal site		2317	22.2%	24	99.3%	7.8%	91.0%	52.2%	65.2%	86.3%
Camp Schiefflin	.	10	90.0%	16	100.0%	.0%	100.0%	80.0%	70.0%	100.0%
	ULIMO-J	4	.0%	24	100.0%	.0%	100.0%	75.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	NPFL	19	73.7%	16	94.7%	5.6%	94.4%	52.6%	52.6%	84.2%
	LPC	25	36.0%	22	100.0%	.0%	100.0%	68.0%	76.0%	92.0%
	ARM. CIV.	6	100.0%	14	100.0%	.0%	100.0%	66.7%	66.7%	100.0%
	AFL	559	.5%	31	100.0%	4.5%	94.1%	42.5%	65.1%	91.9%
Subtotal site		623	6.6%	30	99.8%	4.2%	94.5%	44.9%	65.5%	92.0%
Fassama	ULIMO-K	121	14.9%	26	95.0%	38.0%	61.2%	68.6%	81.0%	73.3%
Subtotal site		121	14.9%	26	95.0%	38.0%	61.2%	68.6%	81.0%	73.3%

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DDR site	Faction	# DS	% Chld	Mean age	% Male	% Muslim	% Christ.	% Father alive	% Mother alive	% Schooling
Gbarnga	.	18	23.5%	25	100.0%	.0%	85.7%	28.6%	57.1%	85.7%
	NPFL	2448	12.7%	25	99.1%	4.8%	85.7%	58.6%	73.5%	93.1%
	LPC	3	.0%	35	100.0%	.0%	100.0%	33.3%	100.0%	66.7%
	INPFL	1	.0%	25	100.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	CRC	1	.0%	23	100.0%	.	.	100.0%	.	100.0%
Subtotal site		2471	12.8%	25	99.1%	4.8%	85.7%	58.5%	73.5%	93.1%
Greenville	NPFL	357	14.6%	24	99.7%	1.4%	98.0%	60.2%	70.6%	80.1%
Subtotal site		357	14.6%	24	99.7%	1.4%	98.0%	60.2%	70.6%	80.1%
Harper	.	1	.0%	20	100.0%	.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	NPFL	283	20.5%	24	98.2%	4.7%	94.2%	55.0%	67.9%	91.6%
Subtotal site		284	20.4%	24	98.2%	4.7%	94.2%	55.1%	68.0%	91.6%
Kakata	.	1	.0%	29	100.0%	.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	NPFL	2887	15.2%	25	99.8%	7.6%	91.2%	62.8%	75.6%	83.5%
Subtotal site		2888	15.1%	25	99.8%	7.6%	91.2%	62.8%	75.6%	83.5%
Kanweaken	NPFL	16	.0%	26	100.0%	.0%	100.0%	50.0%	68.6%	93.8%
Subtotal site		16	.0%	26	100.0%	.0%	100.0%	50.0%	68.8%	93.8%
Sanniquellie	NPFL	691	7.3%	27	99.7%	5.5%	93.8%	54.8%	67.0%	93.3%
Subtotal site		691	7.3%	27	99.7%	5.5%	93.8%	54.8%	67.0%	93.3%
Sawmill	.	4	25.0%	26	100.0%	.0%	100.0%	66.7%	66.7%	66.7%
	ULIMO-K	1180	22.6%	25	98.6%	48.7%	51.1%	58.3%	72.1%	62.5%
	ULIMO-J	2	50.0%	23	100.0%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	NPFL	3	100.0%	16	100.0%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	66.7%	33.3%
	INPFL	1	.0%	18	100.0%	.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Subtotal site		1190	22.9%	25	98.6%	48.5%	51.3%	58.3%	72.1%	62.5%
Tappita	NPFL	754	15.8%	26	98.3%	4.3%	95.1%	48.5%	65.4%	89.5%
	LPC	5	.0%	27	80.0%	.0%	100.0%	60.0%	60.0%	80.0%
Subtotal site		759	15.7%	26	98.2%	4.2%	95.1%	48.6%	65.3%	89.4%
Tubmanburg	ULIMO-J	297	27.3%	23	99.0%	15.3%	83.7%	54.6%	72.4%	85.1%
	LDF	107	40.2%	22	97.2%	8.4%	91.6%	64.5%	82.2%	86.9%
Subtotal site		404	30.7%	23	98.5%	13.5%	85.8%	57.2%	75.0%	85.6%
Woinjama	.	2	.0%	39	100.0%	100.0%	.0%	.0%	50.0%	.0%
	ULIMO-K	3031	19.1%	25	95.3%	68.3%	31.3%	58.7%	75.1%	70.0%
	NPFL	2	50.0%	29	100.0%	50.0%	50.0%	50.0%	100.0%	.0%
Subtotal site		3035	19.1%	25	95.3%	68.3%	31.3%	58.7%	75.1%	69.9%

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DDR site	Faction	# DS	% Chld	Mean age	% Male	% Muslim	% Christ.	% Father alive	% Mother alive	% Schooling
Zwedru	LPC	592	55.0%	19	99.5%	1.0%	90.1%	61.4%	74.7%	87.3%
	AFL	13	.0%	33	100.0%	.0%	100.0%	15.4%	69.2%	100.0%
Subtotal site		605	53.6%	19	99.5%	1.0%	90.3%	60.4%	74.5%	87.6%
Grand Total		20411	20.2%	24	98.7%	20.1%	77.9%	57.1%	72.2%	84.3%

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Destination	weekly	# DS	ULIMO-K	ULIMO-J	NPFL	LPC	LDF	INPFL	CRC	Civil	AFL
.	.	2	100.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	11/22/96	93	.0%	8.7%	84.8%	4.3%	1.1%	.0%	.0%	.0%	1.1%
	11/29/96	101	5.0%	11.9%	65.3%	2.0%	.0%	1.0%	1.0%	.0%	13.9%
	12/06/96	110	8.3%	1.8%	84.4%	1.8%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	3.7%
	12/13/96	109	4.6%	.0%	89.0%	3.7%	.0%	.0%	.0%	1.8%	.9%
	12/20/96	19	10.5%	.0%	84.5%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	12/27/96	27	3.7%	3.7%	85.2%	.0%	.0%	3.7%	.0%	.0%	3.7%
	01/03/97	23	39.1%	.0%	60.9%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/10/97	55	69.1%	1.8%	25.5%	3.6%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/17/97	175	37.4%	.0%	62.6%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/24/97	299	30.4%	.7%	65.0%	2.8%	1.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/31/97	179	19.3%	2.3%	55.7%	21.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	1.7%
	02/07/97	43	23.3%	.0%	16.3%	60.5%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
Sub total County		1235	21.9%	2.5%	65.9%	7.0%	.3%	.2%	.1%	.2%	2.0%
Bomi	11/22/96	51	2.0%	66.7%	27.5%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	3.9%
	11/29/96	36	.0%	86.1%	8.3%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	5.6%
	12/06/96	26	19.2%	53.8%	23.1%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	3.8%
	12/13/96	11	36.4%	18.2%	45.5%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	12/20/96	7	14.3%	.0%	85.7%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	12/27/96	3	.0%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/03/97	8	37.5%	25.0%	37.5%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/10/97	35	92.9%	.0%	17.1%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/17/97	55	52.7%	14.5%	32.7%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/24/97	174	32.2%	11.1%	33.3%	1.2%	22.2%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/31/97	67	13.4%	23.9%	59.7%	1.5%	1.5%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	02/07/97	9	55.6%	22.2%	22.2%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
Sub total County		482	29.4%	26.7%	34.0%	.6%	8.1%	.0%	.0%	.0%	1.0%
Bong	11/22/96	146	2.0%	1.6%	94.3%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	1.0%
	11/29/96	136	7.4%	.7%	81.6%	1.5%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	4.8%
	12/06/96	210	.0%	.0%	96.7%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	3.3%
	12/13/96	186	.5%	.0%	98.9%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.5%
	12/20/96	37	2.7%	.0%	91.9%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	5.4%
	12/27/96	52	.0%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/03/97	47	12.8%	.0%	87.2%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/10/97	84	44.0%	.0%	56.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/17/97	369	22.8%	.0%	77.2%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/24/97	985	7.1%	.0%	92.3%	.3%	.2%	.1%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/31/97	540	2.8%	.9%	95.0%	1.1%	.0%	.0%	.2%	.0%	.0%
	02/07/97	61	24.6%	.0%	73.8%	1.6%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
Sub total County		2953	8.3%	.3%	89.9%	.4%	.1%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.9%

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Destination	weekly	# DS	ULIMO-K	ULIMO-J	NPFL	LPC	LDF	INPFL	CRC	Civil	AFL
Cape Mount	11/22/96	11	9.1%	18.2%	72.7%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	11/29/96	7	14.3%	28.6%	42.9%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	14.3%
	12/06/96	23	69.6%	4.3%	21.7%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	4.3%
	12/13/96	6	.0%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	12/20/96	1	.0%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	12/27/96	3	.0%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/03/97	9	44.4%	.0%	55.6%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/10/97	48	95.8%	.0%	4.2%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/17/97	74	90.5%	.0%	9.5%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/24/97	128	68.8%	1.6%	28.9%	.0%	.8%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/31/97	34	38.2%	5.9%	52.9%	2.9%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	02/07/97	5	40.0%	.0%	60.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
Sub total County		349	68.2%	2.6%	28.1%	.3%	.3%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.6%
Grand Basse		2	.0%	50.0%	50.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	11/22/96	177	.0%	.0%	92.1%	1.1%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	6.8%
	11/29/96	134	1.5%	2.2%	67.9%	3.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	25.4%
	12/06/96	48	4.2%	.0%	77.1%	8.3%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	10.4%
	12/13/96	32	3.1%	.0%	87.5%	3.1%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	6.3%
	12/20/96	30	.0%	.0%	90.0%	10.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	12/27/96	23	.0%	.0%	87.0%	13.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/03/97	40	.0%	.0%	92.5%	7.5%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/10/97	24	29.2%	.0%	66.7%	4.2%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/17/97	40	20.0%	.0%	77.5%	2.5%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/24/97	323	2.2%	.6%	91.6%	5.3%	.3%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/31/97	228	.0%	.0%	90.4%	9.6%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	02/07/97	59	.0%	.0%	96.6%	3.4%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
Sub total County		1160	2.3%	.5%	87.1%	5.4%	.1%	.0%	.0%	.0%	4.6%
Grand Gedeh	11/22/96	38	.0%	10.5%	10.5%	39.5%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	39.5%
	11/29/96	30	.0%	3.3%	.0%	36.7%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	60.0%
	12/06/96	24	.0%	.0%	.0%	62.5%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	37.5%
	12/13/96	18	.0%	.0%	.0%	72.2%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	27.8%
	12/20/96	10	.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	12/27/96	5	.0%	.0%	40.0%	60.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/03/97	6	.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/10/97	18	.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/17/97	8	25.0%	.0%	12.5%	62.5%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/24/97	32	15.6%	3.1%	15.6%	62.5%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	3.1%
	01/31/97	73	4.1%	6.8%	11.0%	74.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	4.1%
	02/07/97	14	14.3%	.0%	21.4%	64.3%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
Sub total County		276	4.3%	4.0%	8.3%	64.9%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	18.5%

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Destination	weekly	# DS	ULIMO-K	ULIMO-J	NPFL	LPC	LDF	INPFL	CRC	Civil	AFL
Grand Kru	11/29/96	3	33.3%	33.3%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	33.3%
	01/03/97	2	.0%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/10/97	2	50.0%	.0%	50.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/17/97	1	.0%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/24/97	11	9.1%	.0%	81.8%	9.1%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/31/97	36	5.6%	.0%	91.7%	2.8%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	02/07/97	18	.0%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
Sub total County		73	6.8%	1.4%	87.7%	2.7%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	1.4%
Lofa		1	100.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	11/22/96	92	21.7%	6.5%	63.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	4.7%
	11/29/96	141	64.5%	5.0%	12.1%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	18.4%
	12/06/96	112	40.2%	1.8%	49.1%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	4.9%
	12/13/96	88	20.5%	.0%	77.3%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	2.3%
	12/20/96	19	36.8%	.0%	57.9%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	5.3%
	12/27/96	40	25.0%	.0%	75.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/03/97	84	83.3%	.0%	16.7%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/10/97	285	90.2%	.4%	9.5%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/17/97	758	85.8%	.1%	14.0%	.0%	.0%	.1%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/24/97	659	70.5%	.5%	28.2%	.0%	.8%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/31/97	414	75.5%	1.2%	23.1%	.2%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	02/07/97	204	96.1%	.0%	3.9%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
Sub total County		3097	73.7%	.8%	23.6%	.0%	.2%	.0%	.0%	.0%	1.5%
Margibi	11/22/96	147	2.7%	.0%	93.9%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	3.4%
	11/29/96	62	4.8%	.0%	80.6%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	14.5%
	12/06/96	32	3.1%	.0%	65.6%	6.3%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	25.0%
	12/13/96	76	1.5%	.0%	76.5%	8.8%	.0%	.0%	.0%	5.9%	7.4%
	12/20/96	14	.0%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	12/27/96	24	4.2%	.0%	95.8%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/03/97	18	22.2%	.0%	77.8%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/10/97	40	47.5%	.0%	52.5%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/17/97	118	16.1%	.8%	78.8%	2.5%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	3.7%
	01/24/97	433	4.8%	.9%	85.9%	8.1%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.2%
	01/31/97	562	1.6%	.2%	96.8%	1.4%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	02/07/97	37	16.2%	.0%	83.8%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
Sub total County		1563	5.7%	.4%	88.3%	3.5%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.3%	1.9%

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Destination	weekly	# DS	ULIMO-K	ULIMO-J	NPFL	LPC	LDF	INPFL	CRC	Civil	AFL
Maryland	11/22/96	8	.0%	12.5%	25.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	62.5%
	11/29/96	16	.0%	.0%	50.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	50.0%
	12/06/96	9	.0%	11.1%	77.8%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	11.1%
	12/13/96	7	.0%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	12/20/96	5	.0%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	12/27/96	4	.0%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/03/97	2	.0%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/10/97	8	62.5%	.0%	37.5%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/17/97	17	17.6%	.0%	82.4%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/24/97	52	5.8%	.0%	94.2%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/31/97	108	.9%	.9%	98.1%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	02/07/97	10	.0%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
Sub total County		246	4.9%	1.2%	88.2%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	5.7%
Montserrado	.	14	14.3%	14.3%	50.0%	21.4%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	11/22/96	939	5.4%	35.7%	30.6%	15.5%	6.2%	.1%	.0%	.3%	6.2%
	11/29/96	665	11.7%	20.1%	34.4%	12.2%	2.9%	.0%	.2%	2.1%	16.4%
	12/06/96	428	15.9%	13.1%	39.7%	11.7%	1.6%	.0%	.0%	4.0%	14.0%
	12/13/96	308	13.4%	8.1%	49.8%	15.6%	2.0%	.0%	.0%	1.6%	9.4%
	12/20/96	114	13.6%	7.3%	46.2%	23.6%	.9%	.0%	.0%	.0%	6.4%
	12/27/96	212	11.3%	11.3%	51.3%	23.6%	.5%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.1%
	01/03/97	283	33.1%	7.7%	42.6%	13.6%	2.2%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.7%
	01/10/97	510	44.9%	8.5%	36.0%	9.1%	.6%	.2%	.0%	.0%	.6%
	01/17/97	603	40.5%	8.5%	43.7%	6.8%	.2%	.1%	.0%	.0%	.1%
	01/24/97	1648	24.2%	4.9%	55.4%	10.9%	4.2%	.0%	.1%	.0%	.3%
	01/31/97	771	16.6%	8.2%	61.9%	11.8%	.5%	.1%	.0%	.0%	.9%
	02/07/97	190	37.9%	2.1%	49.5%	10.5%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
Sub total County		7085	21.9%	12.8%	45.4%	12.1%	2.6%	.1%	.0%	.6%	4.5%
Nimba	.	2	100.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	11/22/96	52	3.8%	.0%	84.6%	1.9%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	9.6%
	11/29/96	38	13.2%	.0%	65.8%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	21.1%
	12/06/96	23	21.7%	.0%	65.2%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	13.0%
	12/13/96	39	2.6%	.0%	94.9%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	2.6%
	12/20/96	48	.0%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	12/27/96	40	5.0%	.0%	95.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/03/97	8	62.5%	.0%	37.5%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/10/97	66	34.8%	.0%	65.2%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/17/97	94	38.3%	.0%	61.7%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/24/97	560	2.7%	.0%	97.1%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/31/97	188	13.8%	.5%	85.6%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	02/07/97	22	40.9%	.0%	59.1%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
Sub total County		1180	11.1%	.1%	87.2%	.2%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	1.4%

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Destination	weekly	# DS	ULIMO-K	ULIMO-J	NPFL	LPC	LDF	INPFL	CRC	Civil	AFL
Rivercess	11/22/96	24	.0%	.0%	91.7%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	8.3%
	11/29/96	26	.0%	.0%	92.3%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	7.7%
	12/06/96	3	.0%	.0%	66.7%	33.3%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	12/13/96	1	.0%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	12/20/96	1	.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	12/27/96	2	.0%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/03/97	52	.0%	.0%	96.2%	.0%	.0%	1.9%	.0%	1.9%	.0%
	01/24/97	24	.0%	.0%	87.5%	12.5%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/31/97	27	.0%	.0%	92.6%	7.4%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	02/07/97	21	.0%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
Sub total County		181	.0%	.0%	92.8%	3.9%	.0%	.6%	.0%	.6%	2.2%
Sinoe	11/22/96	12	.0%	8.3%	16.7%	33.3%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	41.7%
	11/29/96	16	.0%	6.3%	18.8%	12.5%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	62.5%
	12/06/96	16	.0%	6.3%	50.0%	18.8%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	25.0%
	12/13/96	11	.0%	.0%	63.6%	9.1%	9.1%	.0%	.0%	.0%	18.2%
	12/20/96	7	.0%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	12/27/96	6	.0%	.0%	50.0%	33.3%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	16.7%
	01/03/97	3	.0%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/10/97	5	50.0%	.0%	40.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/17/97	49	.0%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/24/97	143	.0%	2.1%	80.4%	16.1%	1.4%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/31/97	136	.0%	.7%	78.7%	20.6%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	02/07/97	32	.0%	.0%	78.1%	21.9%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
Sub total County		436	.7%	1.6%	75.9%	16.1%	.7%	.0%	.0%	.0%	5.0%
Abravard	11/22/96	9	.0%	33.3%	44.4%	11.1%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	11.1%
	11/29/96	2	50.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	50.0%
	12/06/96	4	100.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	12/13/96	4	25.0%	.0%	25.0%	50.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	12/20/96	1	.0%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/03/97	3	33.3%	.0%	66.7%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/10/97	16	100.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/17/97	12	83.3%	.0%	16.7%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/24/97	36	63.9%	2.8%	30.6%	.0%	2.8%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	01/31/97	7	42.9%	28.6%	28.6%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	02/07/97	1	.0%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
Sub total County		95	62.1%	6.3%	25.3%	3.2%	1.1%	.0%	.0%	.0%	2.1%
Grand Total		20411	24.8%	5.6%	58.5%	6.6%	1.2%	.0%	.0%	.2%	3.0%